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RE-MEMBERING LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONALIZING WORLD*
Vivian Grosswald Curran**
Le chalandglisse sans trove sous l'eau de satin,
Oi s 'en va-t-il, vers quel rove, vers quel incertain du destin?
...

[Lie courantfaitde nous toujours des errants...

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article addresses the current unprecedented intermingling of
laws and legal norms in our internationalizing world. It examines in
particular the meeting of the common and civil law in the European
Union as an indication of the often unseen and misunderstood issues that
lurk beneath the surface where law joins different communities, and
where it meets within them.
These issues are of still greater magnitude when transposed to a
global level. They involve contexts of origin that produce different
understandings of legal standards allegedly shared across legal cultures,
and conflicting approaches to future orientations of law that derive from
unspoken, incompatible ideas about the nature of law and the needs of
legal orders.

* A la m~moire de Blanche, ma sceur bien-aim~e. C'est ton oeuvre A peine entam~e que je
tente de continuer ici.
** Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. My thanks to Francesca Bignami, Ralf
Michaels and the lively students in their seminar at Duke Law School for a helpful discussion of this
paper; to Annelise Riles and Mitchel Lasser for their kind invitation to present this paper at the
Cornell comparative law conference they organized in Paris in July, 2004; to Margaret Mahoney for
comments on an earlier draft; to Linda Tashbook for invaluable assistance in locating foreign
materials; to Justine Stefanelli for her research assistance; and to my dean, David Herring, for
providing a summer grant to support the writing of this article. Unless otherwise noted, translations
are mine.
1. From LE CHALAND QUI PASSE, a French song popular in the 1930s ("The barge slides
without cease beneath the water of satin / Where is it headed, towards which dream, which
uncertainty of fate? /... The current always transforms us into wanderers...").
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Comparative analysis is of urgent importance to clarify the ongoing
debates. It is needed not just among different legal communities, but also
within each, as our world evolves both through new encounters of laws
and legal norms throughout the world, and by transitions within national
legal systems that require continuing recollection and examination of
history. The "re-membering" of law that this article hopes to shed light
on deals with (1) recompositions of law as it increasingly ignores old
borders and categories; and (2) the ongoing need to remember law's past
meanings in order to understand its present incarnations and imagine its
potentials.

II.

LAW LIKE A RIVER

Our time is marked by accelerating transience.2 Transience is the
characterizing condition both of individual life and of history, but its
speed and visibility of occurrence are not constants. In our era, law is
experiencing currents of change at a dizzying pace, increasing the
difficulty of assessing the present.
In studying individual consciousness, the neurologist Oliver Sacks
emphasizes the role of successive, discrete mental imaging as the key to
human perception, such that the concept of the person as a stable entity
must be revisited.3 Law too cannot be understood without accepting the
centrality of transience to its nature and experience. But what does a
transient nature imply about continuity? The past is supplanted, but it
does not disappear. Rather, it functions as an inescapable and formative
frame of reference that processes and defines the present, and the
presently changing, law:
How, if there is only transience, do we achieve continuity? Our passing
thoughts.., do not wander round like wild cattle. Each one is owned,
our own, and bears the brand of this ownership, and each thought... is
born an owner of the thoughts that went before, and dies owned,
transmitting whatever it realized as its Self to its own later
proprietor .... [W]e consist entirely of a collection of moments, even
though these flow into one another like [a] ... river.4
Continuity thus emerges notwithstanding discontinuity, and must
be understood as part of an ongoing process of change, as new moments
2. On the "accelerated rate" of evolution in modem civilization, see Henri Marrou, The
Heritageof the Ancient World, in I CHAPTERS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION It (3d ed. 1961).
3. See Oliver Sacks, In the River of Consciousness, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 15, 2004, at 41,
44.
4. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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collect both to displace and to redefine the old even as they give shape to
the present. But just as mathematics tell us that there can be infinities of
differing sizes, 5 there can be newness supplanting the old that in some
eras are newer in kind than in other eras, transiences of greater
magnitude in some times than in others. Not only is law by its nature
vulnerable to having "ideological drifts" that both enable and obfuscate
changes,6 but, in addition, our era is one of both compounded change
and of a compounded obfuscation of change.
Today, "[t]he various human communities are no longer merely in
contact, . . . [t]hey are in a state of mutual penetration....
The legal
norms that are multiplying and meeting signify differently according to
context, a context which may be that of nation, or of kind of court, or of
the legal status of the norm in the forum in question. 8 Contexts that
endow legal standards with various
meanings may challenge law's
9
neutrality.
or
objectivity
for
capacity

5. See MALCOLM E. LINES, A NUMBER FOR YOUR THOUGHTS: FACTS AND SPECULATIONS
ABOUT NUMBERS FROM EUCLID TO THE LATEST COMPUTERS 189-99 (1986).

6. See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869
(1993).
7.
AND

Andrd Tunc, Comparative Law, Peace and Justice, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE

CONFLICTS

LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA

80,

83

(Kurt H.

Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961).
8.

See,

e.g.,

MIREILLE

DELMAS-MARTY,

LE

RELATIF

ET

L'UNIVERSEL:

LES

FORCES

IMAGINATES DU DROIT (2004) [hereinafter DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL]; David

Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1697 (2003). The profusion of norms is such that drafters of a
proposed European civil code complain of the difficulty "paradoxically... [of] integrat[ing] the
uniform law that already exists" in addition to devising a code that articulates the commonalities of
EU member state laws. Christian von Bar, Le groupe d'6tudes sur un code civil europden, 1-2001
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 127, 137 (2001). Various sorts of uniform

regimes thus intertwine in potential mutual interference. On the problem of conflicts between the
EU's human rights regime (1)with that of the member states, see Craig T. Smith & Thomas Fetzer,
The Uncertain Limits of the European Court of Justice's Authority: Economic Freedom Versus
Human Dignity, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 445 (2004); (2) with that of the ECHR, see Ambrose EvansPritchard, EU Judges End Human Rights Law for Press, DAILY TELEGRAM, Oct. 18, 2004,
available at http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/l 0/18/weu l8.xml. For
contrasting approaches to the issue of intertwining domains of law on a non-national level, see
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183 (1997); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUCHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION
ECONOMIQUE ET UNIVERSALISME DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (2004) [hereinafter DELMAS-MARTY,
GLOBALISATION].

9. On the one hand, it may be that legal standards which depend on context may be capable
of objectivity and neutrality in a context-specific sense, as Isaiah Berlin's work would imply. Henry
Hardy summarizes Berlin's position over his lifetime on this point in his introduction to the first
volume he edited of Berlin's correspondence. See Henry Hardy, Preface to ISAIAH BERLIN,
LETTERS 1928-1946, at xxxvii, xliii (Henry Hardy ed., 2004) (noting that Berlin's pluralist view
rejected relativism, although misinterpretations of his position have confused the two). On the other
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In addressing issues that arise as today's legal orders intermingle,
this article hopes to debunk some fictions and suggest some facts as to
how layers of national and non-national law can interact in ways often
misunderstood because difficult to perceive. I use the awkward term
"non-national" because I mean that which is "other" to the national, but
not precisely international, supranational, transnational, or necessarily
postnational.°
This article examines the dynamic developing between national and
non-national law in Europe. The European model is not an exact replica
of the interaction between traditional national and international law. The
internationalizing world is not shifting to a world governed by
international law, but by a panoply of legal phenomena, and in ways
specific to innumerable contextual factors. While not a mirror for global
developments in law, the EU nevertheless is experiencing some of the
challenges that are characteristic of global incorporations of standards
which do not fit within the traditional international law framework. IIIts
experiences reflect a certain number and kind of obstacles to
understanding law in a world of increasingly mixed and juxtaposed legal
sources, sometimes mutually incompatible, as with principles and claims
of universalism and pluralism, or, as Delmas-Marty puts it in' her
recent
12
book devoted to the subject, of the "relative and the universal."
An aim of this article is to further and to re-orient current
understandings of the national and non-national in law by scrutinizing
the EU's inner grammar. To the extent that Europe's departure from the
nation-state model may presage a new era of socio-political life, the EU
hand, neutrality that may be achievable within a given context, such as a national legal system, may
be unsustainable when the field of application extends to other arenas. A third alternative may be
that context dependence will suggest that law is subjective at its innermost core. Law's
contemporary transitions to increased planetary contacts and claims merely may have rendered this
more visible, and may require us to keep in mind the discomfiting possibility that contextuality may
not be separable from relativism, nor relativism from subjectivity.
10. Habermas has coined the term "post-national" for the EU, a concept that Christian Joerges
specifically endorses with respect to law. I am reluctant to adopt that term because of how much
remains unknown as to both the depth and nature of the departures from the national law that
abound in today's overlapping legal domains. The struggle for terms in this area to describe the
current non-national law is reflected in Eric Wyler, "L 'internationaliti"en droit international
public, 108 REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 633 (2004). To this list, one now
also may add "sub-national." See Stephen Tiemey, Refraining Sovereignty? Sub-State National
Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 161 (2005).
11. See infra Part 11.
12. MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL, supra note 8. For an extremely
interesting analysis of law's simultaneous globalization and fragmentation through the lens of Carl
Schmitt's Nomos der Erde, see Martti Koskenniemi, InternationalLaw as PoliticalTheology: How
to Read Nomos der Erde?, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 492 (2004).
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may be both a hallmark of our historical period, and a precedent for the
rest of the world to emulate or avoid, depending on how it unfolds.13
As our world struggles with twin principles of universalism and
pluralism, and as inter-, trans-, supra, and sub-national legal norms
increasingly find their way into and among national legal systems, 14 it
becomes crucial to decide the ways and extent to which the national
should be retained and should prevail, and the ways in which it should
be eradicated. 15 The EU's uniquely visible potentials for departing from
national aspects of law, and the incipient stage of its development, make
it useful for exploring how future orientations should deal with the
nation-state model, however difficult it may be even to imagine effective
alternatives to past experiences.
This article focuses on issues associated specifically with law, one
of which is to decipher the nature of law's capacity to internationalize. It
more particularly examines the peculiar dynamic where law purports to
have meaning for legal systems with significantly different underlying
cognitive grids.' 6 It is true, as Clifford Geertz put it, that "whatever it is
13. See Yves Lequette, Quelques remarques apropos du projet de code civil europden de M
von Bar, D. [2002] chron., at 2202, 2211 (2002) (noting that the EU may undermine and destroy its
vision of future peace if it abandons national distinctions in favor of European legal unification).
14. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL, supra note 8, at 7-14. The
United States has tended to be legally insular, and its resistance to foreign and comparative law is
exemplified by the recent House Resolution disapproving the United States Supreme Court's use of
"foreign laws and public opinion in their decisions, [and] urging the end of this practice
immediately... " H.R. 468, 108th Cong. (2003). On the other hand, United States Supreme Court
Justices such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sandra Day O'Connor have endorsed
comparative legal approaches to resolve U.S. cases, and the House Resolution was a reaction
against this trend in the Supreme Court's decision-making. See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor,
Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAW.,
Sept. 1998, at 20, 20-21. For the most recent exchange by United States Supreme Court Justices on
this issue, see Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, U.S. Supreme Court Justices, Discussion at
American University Washington College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf
/0/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). On
issues of international and national law commingling in France as sources of law in the formation of
the French legal system after the Revolution as the new nation-state was taking shape, see JEANLouis HALPERIN, ENTRE NATIONALISME JURIDIQUE ET COMMUNAUTE DE DROIT 7-45 (1999).

15. See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 8, at 183-84 (arguing equally
against a "liberal internationalist ideal" and a "new medievalism" that "proclaim[s] the end of the
nation-state," and in favor of a disaggregation of the state into "functionally distinct parts
[that] ...are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating ...a new, transgovernmental

order"). Slaughter emphasizes the unofficial manner in which transgovernmentalism has been
evolving. See id.at 190. She concludes that "[t]ransgovemmental networks often promulgate their
own rules, but the purpose of those rules is to enhance the enforcement of national law." Id. at 191.
16. See Christian Joerges, Europeanization as Process: Thoughts on the Europeanization of
Private Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing law in what he calls a "multilevel [legal] system," and the EU as a "multidimensional disaggregation of statehood").
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that the law is after it is not the whole story,"' 7 but law is a core part of
the story.
Decisions as to future directions in law urgently require an
understanding of current realities. It is difficult to understand the present
in a time of multiple and rapid changes where non-national models may
be externally different from but substantively similar to the national, and
vice versa.' 8 It is a process of decoding a language whose connotations
change just as they begin to acquire meaning, a language in which all of
the speakers are among the uninitiated. This article seeks to take a step
in the interpretive process.
III.

COINCIDING

The legal approaches of the EU's member states correspond to two
ideas of law, two distinctive manners of legal reasoning, and emanate
from two modes of intellectual discourse that have separated the law
worlds of Europe in the past. Some of the presences, absences and
meanings of the common and the civil law that combine in the EU today
have been misinterpreted due to deceptive appearances of surface
similarity or difference.
These challenges to legal understanding are still greater on the
global level where normative claims of universal applicability implicitly
also contain claims of human-wide commonality, despite vast
separations of geography and historical development throughout the
world, covering areas and peoples with far fewer historical and cultural
intersections than among the EU member states. While the European
phenomenon may be different from the global one precisely because of a
more common, shared heritage,' 9 to the extent that its lack of
commonality (a focus of this article) impedes legal integration, we may

17. CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1983).
18. See infra Part IV.

LOCAL

KNOWLEDGE:

FURTHER

ESSAYS

IN INTERPRETATIVE

19. On the proclaimed commonality of legal heritage of the EU member states, see Treaty on
the European Union (EU) art. F(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253; in the context
of the European Convention on Human Rights, see European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
European Convention]. Slaughter and Heifer argue that the European experience is able to be
generalized on a global scale, but their point of departure is that the European experience in law is a
success story to be emulated. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
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conclude that similar interactions are operating at a still greater
magnitude in the larger global context.2 °
This article examines whether two worlds cohabiting within Europe
can meet and join in the law and the courts, or if their forced encounter
today is an unmindful collision. It illustrates this issue, of still greater
magnitude and complexity for global interactions, by examining the case
of Pretty v. United Kingdom.2 1 The applicant, dying of a degenerative
and incapacitating disease, had lost her national court actions to procure
immunity from prosecution for her spouse if he were to assist her in
committing suicide. The case's origins were in the common law courts
of the UK, from which the plaintiff appealed to the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR"). That decision became a source of law, inter
alia, to all of the EU's member states, thus applying both to the common
law state in which it had originated, and to the civil law states of the EU,
because they all are signatories to the European Convention on Human
Rights.22
The ECHR decision differed markedly from the manner in which it
was understood by and absorbed into one civil law state: namely,
France. The case's trajectory illustrates what a realm of legal encounter
between two legal systems both means and does not mean. The common
law origins of Pretty were absorbed and even extended by the ECHR, as
the European court wrote a bi-methodological decision, demonstrating a
genuine convergence of common and civil law. 23 France's rendition of
that decision to its national
legal community expurgated its common law
24
attributes, however.
Pretty illuminates an ongoing dual integration and dis-integration in
law when communities share enacted legal standards that resonate

20. Toynbee advocated the examination of events of small scale to assist the process of
historical analysis and reasoning. He was of the view that the comparatively small scale of the
Peloponnesian War was crucial to Thucydides's success in analyzing it rationally, and that
subsequent eras have profited from his analysis in understanding the far later and vaster world wars
of the twentieth century. See Marrou, supra note 2, at 28-29.
21. 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157.
22. See European Convention, supra note 19; see also Matthias Hartwig, Much Ado About
Human Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights,

6 GERMAN L.J. 869 (2005), available at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/article.php?id=600
(providing a recent discussion of issues of signatory state independence from ECHR decisions).
23. See infra Part V.
24.

Carole Girault, La Cour EDH ne reconnaitpas l 'existence d'un droit t la mort, JCP 2003
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differently because they are understood through and expressed in
distinctive codes, or systems of signs.2 5
The Pretty case also serves to remind that it is simplistic to assume
the continuing validity of law-processing models when institutional
frameworks are modified. Thus, the applicability of the supreme court
model which national law systems have trained the western legal mind
to associate with judicial constructs no longer is adequate to explain the
new legal order.26 Despite an official hierarchy that attributes ultimate
substantive superiority to European courts, they are the last fora of
appeal without being supreme, because a case's real trajectory does not
end with its substantive legal resolution if the court of last resort is the
ECHR or the European Court of Justice ("ECJ").
In the step into national legal systems that each case takes after the
European courts have adjudicated, the peculiar integration of law that is
occurring within the European tribunals 27 reverses itself, as national
legal cultures process and absorb European court decisions through the
filter of national legal categories, with cognitive grids of civil or
common law creation that do not assimilate information from the other
system of legal thinking and reasoning. Thus, the "supreme" European
courts that formally represent the parties' ultimate recourse are only a
penultimate level of significance.28
The process of France's rendition and understanding of the ECHR
Pretty decision speaks to the manner in which law signifies within
national legal communities today. A hidden layer beneath apparent legal
integration reflects resistance to the new that is not willful, but results
from classifications and categorizations that reprocess the non-national
through categories incapable of absorbing the new because the
categories themselves have not been altered so as to have the capacity to
admit the new.29 Legal convergence is like a flickering flame, repeatedly
snuffed out by the air into which it is introduced before it can be ignited.

25.

See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Semiotics and Law, in HI-FIVES: A TRIP TO SEMIOTICS

(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1998); Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanizationin the Realm
of PrivateLaw: A Pleafor a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149, 160 (2004)

(discussing the "many... versions of European law").
26.

See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).

27.

For an analysis of legal integration in the ECJ, see Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of

EuropeanLaw at the CrossRoads ofLegal Traditions,39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (1991).

28. European cases also follow another route, not addressed in this article: horizontally
signifying for future cases at the peak level of European court law.
29. For an excellent illustration of how underlying cognitive limitations can impede and
ultimately undermine a legal system's capacity to adopt foreign law, see Elisabetta Grande, Italian
Criminal Justice: Borrowing andResistance,48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2000).
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Member states generally transmit European court decisions to their
legal communities in much the same manner as they present national
court decisions. 30 France is typical in that, despite the widespread
availability of European court decisions in their original form in all
member states, except for specialized practitioners in European law who
do read European court decisions in their original form, lawyers read
them after they have been converted into the legal code of their national
system. 31 The member states to date consequently have remained
entrenched in their national legal mentality.32
Far from being static themselves, however, the member states' legal
systems are representative of today's nation states throughout the world
in that they are evolving with time and multiplying contacts, some due to
the EU and others to the astronomical increase in communication in our
time. The nature of this evolution, however, is not readily apparent, and,
perhaps most significantly, is the more elusive to official control for
being poorly identified. Among others, if the national legal reporters and
commentators who communicate and analyze European court decisions
are unmindful of the underlying mentality coloring their own analysis,
legal integration will be illusory, or, more accurately, will proceed at a
progression.
greatly reduced speed, and in a haphazard
Misunderstandings that undermine legal integration cannot be equated
with preserving national cultural pluralism as envisaged by the EU and
its member states inasmuch as the differences that remain and solidify
do not result from choice.33
Pretty also suggests that legal integration and convergence can
occur; that they are occurring in the European courts of the ECHR and
ECJ; that the barriers to intercultural legal communication both are

30. See infra notes 123-53 and accompanying text.
31. Thus, the specialized practitioners of "European" law engage in specialized "European"
law reading for their practice. See, e.g., I ALEXANDER LAYTON & HUGH MERCER, EUROPEAN CIVIL
PRACTICE (2d ed. 2004). Such works also may wish to gamer readers with national legal practices,
but my observation is that this remains a largely aspirational goal to date. See Lord Bingham of
Cornhill, Foreword, in id. (urging the expansion of European law reading to the national
practitioner: "[A]ny civil or commercial practitioner who today handles cases with what used to be
called 'a foreign element' would be well-advised to have [this book] within easy reach. There was a
time, not so long ago, when national legal systems could regard themselves as splendidly isolated
from those of neighbouring countries, allies and trading partners. The world has changed.").
32. See infra notes 123-53 and accompanying text.
33. See Joerges, supra note 16, at 2 ("[T]he Europeanization of private law should be seen as
a process that triggers disintegration within national private law systems and affects their systematic
consistency.").
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surmountable, 34 and have been surmounted in Europe-specific
institutions, such as the ECJ and the ECHR, but nevertheless that
national legal systems can long remain impervious to "others" with
which they are joined in name, and in the name of law. The presentation
of Pretty to the French legal community suggests far less a conscious
rejection of the "other" than an unconscious rejection. It represents a
failure to recognize the ECHR decision's common law aspects, rather
than an intention to erase them. Conversely, legal convergence is taking
place within the EU member states, but precisely not where it frequently
is trumpeted by those eager to promote and perceive legal convergence.
IV.

DECEPTIVE APPEARANCES

As layers of legal norms from non-national sources become
superimposed on national norms, systems may undergo transformations
difficult to observe because unintended and not visibly substantive in
nature. The very expectation that convergence will result from encounter
has caused a tendency to take apparent convergence for the authentic
item, while simultaneously making it more difficult to perceive its
occurrence elsewhere.
Contrary to frequent claims, it is illusory that anything like a
common law stare decisis became a part of the EU civil law states when
they recognized European court decisions as a source of law. Such
apparent commonality offers tempting bait for overinterpretation, but is
misleading on closer scrutiny. A civilian rendition of the EU legal
system's integration of the common law rule of following precedents is
that Italy and Germany, even internally, actually have become more
common law than the common law states, that they have "transcend[ed]
the limits of the common law ... ,3 because the federal constitutional

courts in those countries do not just view ECJ precedents as binding
future similar cases-they view ECJ decisions also as binding future
factually dissimilarcases:
In the living experience of the process of European integration, as
attests the fact that the German Constitutional Court affirmed that
interpretive decisions "bind all the jurisdictions of the Member States

34. This is disputed by some. For a recent summary of the debate, see Raffaele Caterina,
ComparativeLaw and the Cognitive Revolution, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1505-09 (2004).
35. PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: FROM COMMON MARKET TO
EUROPEAN UNION 190 (Patrick Del Duca trans., 1992). I note with respect to the quoted phrase, as
well as to the following quote, see infra note 36 and accompanying text, that this language is from
the first edition of Mengozzi's book, and is not in his subsequent, second edition (1999).
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invested by the same question even in different cases," there is
growing recognition of the precedential 36value of Court of Justice
decisions even to factually dissimilar cases.
What does such a formulation, utterly foreign to a common law ear,
mean? Closer examination reveals a civilian reformulation of stare
decisis, and a failure of translation. The application of a precedent to a
future dissimilar case is a reinsertion of the civil law tradition into what
is being called a common law respect for case law. It is possible only by
way of a devalorization of the facts of cases, and therefore a rejection of
the most central aspect of the common-law understanding of what case
law is: namely, as fact-based and fact-dependent.3 7
Similarly, the Italian private-law Supreme Court (Corte di
cassazione) often is described in comparative law circles as an example
of how much convergence the modem era is seeing between the
common law and the civil law.38 This is because in modem Italy,
Supreme Court decisions are recognized as a source of law. But when
we look at how they are a source of law, we see that Italian lawyers read
the Court's decisions in the form known as the "massime," short
summaries of the rules of the cases that usually are factually
decontextualized, containing no description of the facts of the case.3 9
Like its English cognate, "maxim," the massima is a normative
principle, written in a style similar to that of an article in a civil code,
such that massime cannot spawn the inductive, analogical reasoning that
is the hallmark of the common law. It comes therefore no longer as a
surprise that, when reformulated as civilian, code-like texts, such alleged
"case law" can be applied to future dissimilarcases.
This "civilianization" of case law lies in indissociably linking cases
to the civilian conception of law as a formulation of prescriptive norms.
A case that is accepted as a source of law in a civil law state is
transformed into a factually decontextualized, normative principle in
order to be deemed "law." Thus, what a common law lawyer would
extract as only one component of the case, namely, its rule, becomes the
36.

Id.

37. For a detailed discussion of the role of facts in common law systems, see Vivian
Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the
Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001) [hereinafter Curran,
Romantic Common Law].
38. See Francesco G. Mazzotta, Precedents in Italian Law, 9 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 121, 128,

140 (2000).
39. See Michele Taruffo & Massimo La Torre, Precedent in Italy, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 141, 148 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,

1997).
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sum total of the case in civil law states which accept cases as a source of
law. This greatly reduces the capacity of such "case law" for the intricate
analogizing and inductive reasoning that depend on fact-based law, and
which are vital characterizing attributes of the common law concept of

"case law."
Moreover, the civilian understanding of the court's role in creating
"case law" is different from its common law counterpart. For the
civilian, the courts whose decisions will be a source of law are
performing the civilian judicial task of applying enacted law-a law
enacted by those endowed with legislative powers. 40 This is a far cry
from the common law idea that courts create case law through case
adjudications, in a dynamic of mutual interaction between living factual
circumstances and analogical reasoning to precedents, so constituted that
even governing legislation, where it exists, 4' recedes in importance to a
vanishing point next to the preeminent court opinions that determine law
and law's meaning.42
On the other hand, legal convergence has been occurring
unobtrusively within member states in the process by which law is
changing. The supremacy of European law has caused throughout the
EU a method of legal change characteristic of common law systems, and
which represents a break with the most profound civil law idea of what
law creation means. First, EU directives are not drafted in a code-like
manner to allow civilian states to apply them in habitual ways, but are
far more detailed in style, in the manner of the common law expectation
for enacted law.43 Moreover, in order to remain compliant with EU
40. See Jean Foyer, "Le Code civil est vivant. I1doit le demeurer!", JCP 2004 1-120 13, at
543, 545 (2004) (criticizing the excessive power that the European courts have acquired in the
process of "interpreting"European Community and human rights law).
41. Moreover, here it should be remembered that the common law tradition is based on a
system in which it is the exception, not the rule, for courts to operate under the aegis of enacted
legislation. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law andLegislation,21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 387 (1908).
42. Kahn-Freund pointed out not only the lowly hierarchical place of the statute in
comparison to case law common law systems, but also and more particularly a greater common law
judicial reluctance to implement public policy where the law is statutory rather than when it is
judge-made case law. OTTO KAHN-FREUND, SELECTED WRITINGS 254 (Modem Law Review 1978).
On ECHR methodology, reflecting the unquestioned assumption that, even though the Court is
committed to keeping the European Convention a living document, attuned to contemporary needs,
the ECHR is applying enacted law, see Bruno Genevois, Le Conseil d'ttat et I "interprdtationde la
loi, 4 RFDA 877, 881 (2002). On the common-law culture's incorporation of legislation into case
law, see Curran, Romantic Common Law, supra note 37.
43. See Christian von Bar, Le groupe d'Otudes sur un code civil europen, 1-2001 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 127, 138 (2001); Foyer, supra note 40, at 545. On

the difference between the two legal cultures in this respect, and the difficulty member state judges
experience when dealing with enacted law from the "other" system, see Lord Denning's opinion in
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directives and court decisions, the member states must change their own
internal laws as necessary. 4 This process goes against the civilian idea
of law as emanating from a coherent whole.45 It is a common law
progression of specific statutory enactments in reaction to changed
circumstances.
Many civilians are disturbed by this. As Zimmermann has put it,
"[t]his way of '[e]uropeanizing'
our... law has been highly
unsatisfactory .... We are dealing with no more than fragments
of... law, inserted... inorganically, and in a 'higgledy-piggledy'
fashion, into the various national legal systems. 4 6 Another civilian legal
scholar writes that this new way of law-formation is in confrontation
with "the established understanding of law. ' 47 This confrontation is with
the established civil law understanding of law, imbued with an
underlying ideology, reflected in Enlightenment thinking, of applying
scientific methods to all areas of study, including law, privileging the
whole, the coherent and interrelatedness, as opposed to the component
part, the particular and the isolated. 48 Not surprisingly, there is support
Bulmer (H P) Ltd v. J Bollinger SA, [1974] 2 All. E.R. 1226, 1236 (C.A.); Curran, Romantic
Common Law, supra note 37.
44. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 10, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
45. For an overview of the civil-law emphasis on the coherent whole, in one of its purest
extant forms, see ANTOINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AMERIQUE ET EN

FRANCE (2003); Christophe Jamin, Un modile original: la construction de la pensge juridique
franqaise,BULLETIN D'INFORMATION COUR DE CASSATION (2004).

46. Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code or Civil Law?-Towards a New European Private
Law, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 217, 218 (1994) [hereinafter Zimmermann, Towards a New
European Private Law] (criticizing the EU-generated process of legal evolution, but not advocating
a European civil code as the remedy); accord Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code and Civil Law:
The "Europeanization" of Private Law Within the European Community and the Re-Emergence of
a European Legal Science, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 63, 78, 80 (1995) [hereinafter Zimmermann,
The "Europeanization" of Private Law]. Zimmerman notes that EU law has "no more than a
tenuous relationship to the core of private law"; id. at 78, and that it is troublesome that EU law is
proceeding apace "without a clearly defined policy"; id. at 79.
47. Friedrich KtUbler, Traumpfade oder Holzwege nach Europa? Oder: Was wir uns der
Rechtsgeschichte wiinschen sollten, 12 RECHTSHISTORISCHES J. 307, 307 (1993).

48. See Curran, Romantic Common Law, supra note 37, at 75-114. But see Zimmermann, The
"Europeanization" of Private Law, supra note 46, at 85 (citing HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION, THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 9 (1983) (discussing the

proposition that overarching legal coherence is the basis of western conception of law, without
differentiation between common and civil law)); Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation
of InternationalLaw? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553, 553-79 (2002) (arguing
that the call for overarching legal coherence is a reaction against the postmodern world, rather than
linking it to civilian legal conceptions. It is noteworthy, however, that the proponents of legal
coherence the authors cite overwhelmingly are civilians, and those they cite as being undisturbed by
current legal fragmentation overwhelmingly are common law jurists). See also Martti Koskenniemi,
InternationalLaw and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 197, 212
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for an EU civil code, which would be just such an overarching,
interrelated whole, embodying the spirit of the law, as to halt the current
manner of progression, and create an all-encompassing tissue of
principles and norms as a retroactively construed point of departure for
all future specific legal developments.4 9
Indeed, in arguing for a European civil code, the head of the study
group to develop the code, Christian von Bar, attributes the
"momentum" for it to a growing uneasiness with the many new EU
directives which had begun to make deep inroads on... national
laws, 50 and because "the current... 'piecemeal' approach of
directives... [is] endangering the quality and systematic coherence of
our private law."5' Von Bar's insistence on such "systematic
coherence' 52 reflects in civilian manner an unquestioned assumption of
the essential
role of both system and overall coherence in the idea of law
53
itself.
Von Bar's view is consistent with fierce criticism in France of the
new legal progression. In the context of domestic anti-terrorism laws
enacted to meet specific problems, one French author criticizes the new
evolution

as

follows:

"The

creation

of

new

violations... also

corresponds to the inflationist trend in defining crimes: the enacted law
no longer exists to resolve in a general way; rather, it resolves
particularproblems ... [but] slid[es] towards a different conception of
criminal law." 54 He emphasizes that law is "there to regulate in a general
manner."55 Further, he signals by his choice of section subtitle, "The
Loss of Essential Frames of Reference,"56 that the danger of legal
evolution by and for the isolated, the particular, and due to factual
occurrences in the life of parties, is nothing less than a danger to the

(2004) ("the space of the cosmopolitan, previously occupied by intergovernmental, federalist public
law schemes is taken up by a 'postmodern' process where the structural coupling between the

political and the legal-constitutionalisation-takes place through fragmented and uncoordinated
forms of normative specification at different levels of transnational activity").
49.
Law,

See Christian v. Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospectsfor European Private
Lecture
at
the
Cour
de
cassation
(Apr.
12,
2002),

http://www.courdecassation.fr/manifestations/conference/2002-04-12-von-Bar/societe-delegislationEN.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
50.

Id

51.
52.
53.

Id at 5 (emphasis added).
Id.
For the crucial nature of both to civilian law ideation, see Jamin, supra note 45.

54. Jean-Paul Levy, P~nalisation et repression: adaptation 6t la criminalitM ou ddrive
scuritaire?,GAZETTE DU PALAIS, May-June 2004, at 1552, 1553.

55. Id. at 1552 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
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meaning of law. 57 As Portalis explained to the legislators of France, the
great lesson that Montesquieu taught in his Spirit of the Laws, was
"never to separate the details from the whole."'5 8
Transposed to a planetary level, this same discomfort with
piecemeal legal progression also observed on the world stage permeates
Delmas-Marty's call for a world-wide legal order that would take stock
of, and overcome, the current progression in law which depends on
multiplying "fragments," 5 9 and that she fears is resulting in "legal world
disorder."60 She emphasizes
that a pluralist legal goal must be of
61
"orderedpluralism."

Conversely, in what reflects a profoundly common law perspective
but is not discussed as such, Anne-Marie Slaughter describes in glowing
and highly optimistic terms contemporary legal and governmental
change on the planetary level, corresponding closely to the "higgledypiggledy" and "piecemeal" method so discomfiting to civilian legal
scholars. 62 She writes that nation states are "disaggregating
into.., functionally distinct parts. These parts-courts, regulatory
agencies, executives and even legislatures-are networking with their
counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a
new, transgovernmental order." 63 She welcomes this new world order of
"transgovernmentalism" based on a proliferation of piecemeal
agreements reached as needed among professional counterparts
throughout society, both private and public, because of how efficiently
they produce solutions to ongoing needs as they present themselves in
our "increasingly borderless world ....
She applauds the process of
state "disaggregation ' 65 for its functional benefits, stressing both that
"[u]niformity of result and diversity of means ' 66 are the hallmark of the
57. Id. For a more detailed discussion of how these two patterns correspond to the common
and civil law, see Curran, Romantic Common Law, supranote 37.
58. CONSEIL D'ETAT ET DU TRIBUNAT, MOTIFS ET DISCOURS PRONONCES LORS DE LA
PUBLICATION DU CODE CIVIL (Portalis et al. eds., Paris, 1838), reprinted in Valerie LasserreKiesow, Le discoursfinalde Portalis,JCP 2004 1-122 13, at 553, 555.
59. DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION, supra note 8, at 3.
60. Id. at 3, 4 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 8; see also SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 8, at 263. For a similar structure to global judicial communication,
see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99
(1994); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003).
63. Slaughter, The Real New World Order,supra note 8, at 184.

64. Id. at 186.
65. See id at 184; SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 8, at 5-6, 12-15, 18-21,
31, 36-37, 132, 254, 257, 263-69 (discussing state disaggregation).
66. Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 8, at 192.
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new world. She defends "disaggregation" and "transgovernmentalism"
against the charge that they diminish democracy and the nation state,
arguing that professional networks operating transgovernmentally are
constrained by national law, and therefore are under the
supervision of
67
"national leaders who are accountable to the[ir] people.,

Slaughter's term of "disaggregation" of the state connotes just the
sort of autonomous multiplicity of measures that typifies common law
legal development, a law based on case by case progressions, and on
statutes enacted where a particular problem and need are identified,
engendering a statutory solution that wrests a specific problem from
judicial control.6 8 In other words, it typifies an evolution antithetical to
the civilian conception of legal evolution and legal order proceeding
from a cohesive, harmonious whole. Delmas-Marty sees the profusion of
new norms that are developing spontaneously without an overarching,
controlling, coherent set of rules, as a dangerous normative
fragmentation,69 while Slaughter, on the other hand, seeks principally to
allay fears that disaggregation may be correlated with democratic
deficits. Indeed, her view is that the resulting disaggregation is positive
because it puts legal progression in the hands of the specialists at local
levels of decision-making and cooperation, who are best able to craft
particular solutions to the particular problems they themselves
encounter.
In contrast, Delmas-Marty fears potential catastrophe from an
overall ethical perspective where the particular change that impacts an
interstate, international arena, need not be engendered and monitored by
an overarching world order. 70 She believes that human rights already are
becoming the collateral damage of an ever-growing accumulation of
isolated developments that functionalist goals have spawned,

67. Id. Compare Weiler's description of the EU's legal order as having "to a large extent
nationalizedCommunity obligations .... Weiler, supra note 26, at 2421.
68. See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 8, at 184; SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER, supra note 8, at 5-6, 12-15, 18-21, 31, 36-37, 132, 254, 257, 263-69 (discussing

state disaggregation).
69.

DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION, supra note 8, at 6-7. Both Niklas Luhmann and

Gfinther Teubner study legal globalization as a unification causing fragmentation, but also as
operating on an inner logic to which extra-legal normativity (such as from the field of ethics) is not
germane. See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004);
Niklas Luhmann, OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal
System, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1419 (1992); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants:Good Faith in British
Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REv. 11 (1998); Gunther
Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A

STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
70.

DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION, supra note 8, at 6-7.
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ungoverned by a coherent legal framework to embody the spirit of law
itself.71 Such a process of "higgledy-piggledy" change already may be
inexorable, as Slaughter believes.72 If so, then the attempts to reverse it
within the EU by a new civil code or constitution may be doomed to
failure. Whether inexorable or 73not, however, it is the reverse of the
civilian conception of law itself.

With the notable exception of Legrand's analysis, the debate is not
taking place on the terrain of common versus civil law, however.74
Neither Slaughter nor Delmas-Marty, nor others, associate their
evaluation in terms of how it typifies a common law versus a civilian
mentality. 75 The common law-civil law divide in my view is central to
understanding much about the underlying nature of the debate, however.
Only by understanding the centrality of the overarching textual legal
normative structure to govern each legal act in civilian legal culture can
one understand why Slaughter's defense of legal disaggregation on the
basis of democratic viability does not address the civilian concern, and
why Delmas-Marty's call for a world order based on enacted textual law
is not shared by Slaughter.
71. The overarching framework that undergirds the civilian concept of law by embodying the
spirit of all the laws, is of law in the general, abstract sense: the French droit; German Recht;
German Gesetz; Spanish
Spanish derecho; Italian diritto,as opposed to enacted law: the French loi;
lege; Italian lei. On the difference, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84 (Oxford 1960) (1651).
72. See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 8; SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER, supra note 8.
73. Similarly undisturbed by challenges to a coherent whole is Stephen Tierney in his
approving analysis of "sub-state" phenomena. See Tiemey, supranote 10.
74. Legrand consistently and insistently has signaled the centrality of differing legal cultures
and mentalities as an unspoken influence on law. He derives a conclusion of inalterable nonconvergence. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 52, 61-62 (1996); Pierre Legrand, Sens et non-sens d'un Code civil europ~en, 48 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 779 (1996) (noting that a European civil code
would be an act of arrogance and an illusory, indeed repressive, symbol of legal convergence).
While it may seem that he underassesses the role of encounter and exchange in spawning
convergence, and overassesses the obstacles to mutual understanding between the common and civil
law, he identifies the many and subtle layers of differences that make a difference. One of his recent
contributions is suggestive of not just the nature, but also the potential, of comparison in law, and
the mysterious and intriguing links between law and life. See Pierre Legrand, The same and the
different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 240 (Pierre Legrand &

Roderick Munday eds., 2003). But see Peter Birks, Roman Law in Twentieth-Century Britain, in
JURISTS UPROOTED: GERMAN-SPEAKING EMIGRE LAWYERS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 24968 (Jack Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004) [hereinafter JURISTS UPROOTED] (noting
that until the decline of Roman law courses in British law schools in the 1960s, all British-educated
lawyers were intimately familiar with the civilian legal mentality through their study of Roman
law).
75. Nor do others in this debate, such as Lequette, von Bar or Mattei. See Lequette, supra
note 13; von Bar, supra note 43; Mattei, infra note 76.
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The debate surrounding a European civil code does not deal only
giving Euopean legal developments the point of departure from,
and points of reference within, a European-wide arena compatible with
the civilian or, alternatively, with the common law understanding of law.
There are other reasons why scholars favor or oppose a European-wide
civil code, and the positions taken do not all tally with the civiliancommon law divide discussed above. 6 Some civil law scholars oppose it
because of unrelated priorities that supersede the desire to organize the
process of law into the civilian idea of coherent law-generation.
This can be seen on the part of French opponents to a European
civil code, who, coming from the more traditional end of the spectrum of
civilian legal culture, might have been expected to be greater proponents
of a European-wide legal framework than their German colleagues.77
Their opposition to a European civil code does not reflect a common law
perspective on the understanding of law, however, but, rather, an
attachment to the French Civil Code of such magnitude as to make them
consider the prospect of France's Civil Code being superseded by a
European code as more dangerous to the integrity of French legal culture
than a piecemeal and therefore disorderly (by civilian standards)
78
progression of law.
Indeed, a principal proponent of this view, Yves Lequette, in
addition to his primary concern that a European civil code would be the
death knell of French legal culture by overriding the national code,
explicitly argues that a European civil code would subvert law by
resulting in an empowerment of judges (a common law attribute) and
thereby undermine legal coherence: legal "diversity could well be
reintroduced from one country to another at the level of [judicial]
application,, 79 a harm that he assumes a European code should be
With,

76.

See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Volume 2, Issue 1

(2002), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/issI/artl (supporting the European
civil code in order to protect consumers); Lequette, supra note 13 (opposing the European civil code
in order to maintain national traditions deemed essential to cultural identity).
77. One can see a predictable civilian opposition to the piecemeal legal evolution in internal
French law where numerous legislative reforms have been occurring without a more comprehensive
rethinking to ensure overall coherence. See LEVY, supra note 54 Jean-Gr~goire Mahinga,
Libralits entre ,poux aprs laloi No. 2004-439 du 26 mai 2004 reformant le divorce, JCP 2005 1-

104 4, at 107 (emphasis added) ("Important modifications are being brought to the law ...the
law.., now awaits a comprehensive reform." ("une reforme d'emsemble")).

78. See Lequette, supra note 13. Lequette's belief that a European civil code must displace
the national ones may we!l be a reasonable prediction. Even while protesting that this would not be
the case, von Bar goes no further than to say that, "[alt this time, no one is aiming. . . to abandon
the existing national codes." von Bar, supra note 43, at 131 (emphasis added).
79. Lequette, supra note 13, at 2210.
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aspiring to prevent. Jean Foyer, former French Minister of Justice and
law professor, believes that an excessive empowerment of judges
already has occurred in European law:
The power of the European Court of Justice in interpreting European
law and that of the European Court of Human Rights are considerable
and-in my opinion---excessive. Portalis [drafter of the French Civil
Code] said that the judge should always be "under the legislator's
supervision." However, [European] Community law and the European
human rights regime are systems in which the courts are all-powerful.
of a legislator able to check their excesses is sorely
The counterbalance
80
wanting.
Like Lequette, Foyer is hostile to a European civil code under the
assumption that it would undermine France's Civil Code: "We should be
under no illusion: if a European civil code comes into being,.., we will
not find in it the concepts of French Law." 81 The view that the national
civil codes of continental Europe reflect each nation state's culture in
profound ways is especially strong in France because of the influence of
the French code on other civil codes enacted as a result of Napoleonic
conquests. 82 The strong attachment to the Civil Code of France, as
opposed to a European one, derives from the belief that the European
code inevitably would displace and supplant the French Civil Code
notwithstanding European pledges of preserving national legal cultures
to the contrary. 83 There is no dearth of French opposition to the uncivilian elements growing in European law, however. Rather, the French
view tends to consider a European civil code as an unacceptable solution
to the problem. Conclusions as to the desirability of a European-wide
code thus depend upon which priorities the proponent or opponent
privileges.
Ugo Mattei, for instance, prioritizes yet another concern. Like
Lequette, Foyer and Legrand, who oppose a European civil code, he

80. Foyer, supra note 40, at 545.
81. Id. at 546; see also Remy Cabrillac, L'Avenir du code civil, JCP 2004 1-121 13, at 547,
548 (noting that a European civil code would mean the erasure of all of the member states'

fundamentally national law).
82. See, e.g., Lequette, supra note 13, at 2213; Foyer, supranote 40, at 544 ("[T]he [French]
Civil Code is a monument of the heritage of France, equal to the Cathedral of Reims or Versailles.
We all remember Napoleon saying.., in Saint Helena: 'my real glory is my civil code.., it shall
not perish ... ') ("le Code civil est un monument du patrimoine frangais, au mime titre que la
cathddralede Reims ou Versailles. Chacun se souvient de la confidence de Napoleon . . . b SainteHdllne : e ma vdritablegloire, c 'est mon code civil... il ne pdrirapoint .... ").
83. See Lequette, supra note 13, at 2213; Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60
MOD. L. REv. 44, 51-52, 53-55 (1997).
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views the adoption of an EU code as "a dramatic rupture with the
past, 84 but Mattei nevertheless favors its adoption. He believes that the
code is needed to promote basic fairness, and that failure to enact it will
lead to gross injustice to consumers, and particularly to the poor.85
Mattei and Di Robilant use the term "psychological refusal" to
decry scholarly denial of the political implications to the debate about
the European civil code.86 Their call to a reality check substantively
echoes some of Delmas-Marty's focus on ethical violations as the
collateral damage of superimposed legal norms meeting outside of an
overarching frame of reference, or legal order.87 Delmas-Marty's
concerns are of a betrayal of basic human rights values as the predictable
and already present danger of failing to establish a world legal order.8 8
She suggests a planetary regime of human rights as a kind of civil code
of the world, describing the legal concepts involved as abstract and
porous. 89 These are the very hallmarks of continental European civil
codes. 90

84. Ugo Mattei & Anna Di Robilant, Les longs adieux: La codification italienne et le Code
Napoldon dans le ddclin du positivisme tatiste, 4-2004 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 847, 861 (2004).
85. See Mattei, supra note 76, at 11, 13, 15, 17-18, 25; Mattei & Di Robilant, supra note 84,
at 861. Contra Zimmermann, The "Europeanization" of Private Law, supra note 46, at 73
(doubting if a common European private law would be able to protect consumers). Mattei and
Di Robilant also signal the inevitably independent future of codes vis-A-vis their drafters; they also
recognized two hundred years ago by Portalis, drafter of the French Civil Code, foreseeing that the
European civil code will elude the control of Brussels: "A single European Code represents a
dramatic rupture with the past and at the same time a political-constitutional moment that cannot
take shape entirely within the Directions of Brussels." Mattei & Di Robilant, supra note 84, at 861.
Portalis put it this way: "[A] myriad of details escapes him [i.e., the legislator]" ("i/ est unefoule de
ddtails qui lui dehappent"). PORTALIS, DISCOURS PRELIMINAIRE AU PREMIER PROJET DE CODE CIVIL
18 (6ditions confluences 1999) (1841).
86. Mattei & Di Robilant, supra note 84, at 861. The denial to which Mattei and Di Robilant
refer may be well below the surface, however, and, as I have described elsewhere, result from
numerous concerns of highly varying natures, such that the debaters are arguing from different
contexts. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, On the Shoulders of Schlesinger: The Trento Common Core
of Private Law Project, 11 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 66, 73 (2003) [hereinafter Curran, Shoulders of
Schlesinger]. Mattei attributes what he views as a European refusal to consider ethical consequences
to legal proposals to the influence of United States scholars on their European colleagues. In my
view, what he criticizes as United States ethical recklessness is, rather, the tradition in U.S.
scholarship of writing without expecting to wield practical influence. See id.
87. See DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION, supranote 8, at 1, 4.
88. Id.; accord MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 17173 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) (endorsing human rights precisely in their "minimalism," and, like
Delmas-Marty, urging them as legally binding and enforceable).
89. See DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION, supra note 8.
90. See GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 45; Jamin, supra note 45; Curran, Romantic
Common Law, supra note 37, at 106 n.212.
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Part of the civilian discomfort with the method of EU law
production today concerns the large quantity of legislative enactments it
is spawning. The civilian legal system's coherence and rule of law are
considered to have depended on paucity of enacted law since the time of
the Napoleonic Code of 1804, because only the generalization and
abstraction of codified law permit civil codes to withstand vicissitudes of
time. 9' Thus, in civilian legal culture, the written law should avoid
specificity and multiplicity precisely because the written should be
permanent, and should transcend time. The idea is that a profusion of
legislation signifies
"useless [enacted] laws [that then] undermine
92
needed laws.,

The Enlightenment tenet of an air-tight framework of logic, reason
and coherence, also fundamental to the civilian conception of law, 93 is
threatened by implosion from a surplus of legislation. Writing endows
law with a character of permanence, 94 but, once written, law becomes
concretized, losing the fluidity of transformative potential that the
unwritten preserves. Consequently, one of France's leading journals of
legal developments carried a supplement in November, 2004, criticizing
the "inflation" in legislative enactments by drawing attention to the
inevitable character of "permanence" that written law creates. 95 As
96
another scholar puts it, European law "tend[s] to ossify the law."
Portalis wrote that "perpetuity is the wish of laws. 9 7 Indeed, the genius
of the civilian states has been the vast unsaid within the written, the
capacity for suggestion inherent in codified principles that are abstract
and vague, such that law's permanence does not undermine the everchanging needs of society.98
More precisely, as the French legal journal criticism of "legislative
inflation" suggests, the civilian view of evolving problems is that they

91. See GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 45. The French Civil Code was the first
successful code of modem times because its drafters understood this. See PORTALIS, supra note 85,
at 17.
92. Foyer, supra note 40, at 545 ("'les] lois inutiles nuisent aux lois nicessaires'").
93. See Curran, Romantic Common Law, supra note 37, at 94.
94. See Dossier special[.] Ligislation; Inflation Legislative Galopanta, J.C.P., No. 46, at I
(Supp. Nov. 10, 2004) ("SpecialFile[:]Legislation," on "GallopingLegislative Inflation").

95. Id.
96. Zimmermann, The "Europeanization"'of PrivateLaw, supra note 46, at 78.
97. Jean Franoois Knegk, Le bicentenaire du Code civil, "p&istyle de la legislation
fran~aise", GAZETTE DU PALAIS, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 8 ("'[Lia perpetuitd est dans le veu des lois"')

(citing Portalis).
98. See, e.g., PORTALIS, supra note 58; GARAPON & PAPDOPOULOS, supra note 45; see also
Mattei & Di Robilant, supra note 84, at 857 (linking codification to an increasing trend to
generalization, as epitomized by the use of general clauses).
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rarely justify enacting legislative solutions, since the text, by virtue of
being.1 text, a.d u.eref. rc concrete and pe nianent, may outlive the
problems and thereby entrap society through written directives that later
become senseless. 99 As Garapon and Papadopoulos suggest in their
recent book, the foundational civilian mythology of overarching
coherence in a codified law that embodies law's spirit remains at the root
of the civilian legal culture,' 00 however many doubts have been cast on
the mythology by continental European theorists such as Kant, Jhering,
Kantorowicz and Ehrlich in Germany, and by Lambert, G~ny and
Saleilles in France.' 0'
Another component of the civilian concern that has not surfaced
explicitly, but that I believe to be a deeply disturbing factor to many
today, is that the profusion of EU law, in turn spawning a profusion of
domestic law, is associated in the civilian mind with being anti-law
because it was a characteristic of the fascist period in Europe that
preceded the formation of the EU. The fascist dictatorships enacted a
huge number of laws, constructing a legalistic facade that hid the
profoundly unlawful nature of the laws themselves: 0 2 "The system
inaugurated a government of men, not of laws, although it operated
through a constant effusion of new statutes."' 0 3 Today, statutory
profusion has acquired a lurking
association in the civilian legal mind
10 4
with the end of the rule of law.

99. See Dossiersp&ial,supranote 94.
100. See GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 45; Curran, Romantic Common Law, supra
note 37. The French legal supplement ends with the Latin dictum, "cessante ratione legis, cessat
lex" ("when the reason of law ceases, so should cease the law").

101. See, e.g.,

IMMANUEL KANT, FIRST INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

(James

Haden trans., 1965); RUDOLF VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IMRECHT (Leipzig, 1884); RUDOLF VON
JHERING, SCHERZ UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ (Darmstadt, 1964) (1884); HERMANN
KANTOROWICZ (GNAEUS FLAVIUS), DER KAMPF UM DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (Heidelberg,
1906); EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (photo. reprint
1994) (Walter L. Moll trans., 1936); 2 CONGRtS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE, PROCtSVERBAUX DES StANCES ET DOCUMENTS (Paris, 1907); FRANCOIS GENY, MITHODE
D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (Paris, 1919); RAYMOND SALEILLES,

Preface, in id.
102. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES ON LEGAL
HISTORY IN NAzI GERMANY 7 (Thomas Dunlop trans., 1998); INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE:
THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 71 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991); RICHARD H.
WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE 390 (1996); Vivian Grosswald Curran,

The Legalization of Racism in a ConstitutionalState: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 10 (1998).
103. Maria L. Marcus, Austria's Pre-War Brown v. Board of Education, 32 FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 1, 36 (2004).
104. Extremely interesting in this regard is that, contrary to perception, the number of new
laws proposed by France's parliament in fact seems not to have increased since 1968. See VIVE LA
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Thus, a supranational civil code, the latter itself a kind of economic
and cultural constitution of Europe, 0 5 would accomplish several civilian
objectives. If approved by all member states, it would ensure that an
overarching, cohesive system engenders particular legal consequences;
that legal developments are not the byproducts of circumstances, rather
than part and parcel of a well thought-out scheme; and that its coherent
framework would be a bulwark against an end to the rule of law,
reversing the current pattern of ever-growing numbers of statutory
enactments due to European requirements, but not emanating from a
reliable cohesive text.
Because the new European process of piecemeal legal evolution has
not been recognized by its opponents as common law in nature, and
indeed came about without being intended as such, its rejection by civil
law scholars has not been associated with any semblance of overt
rejection of the common law as a worthy legal partner. The criticism of a
"higgledy-piggledy" process therefore does not take into consideration
that the current pattern of legal evolution is rich in potential for
increased legal integration, and for bringing together the two law worlds
of Europe in an unexpected way.
V.

LEGAL INTEGRATION AND DIS-INTEGRATION: THE PRETTY CASE

In the ECHR Pretty decision, the space of encounter between the
common and civil law systems led to an interplay of convergence and
non-convergence. 10 6 The ECHR set forth, in prototypical civil-law style,
the texts of the governing law, since the civilian concept of law is a
written text that applies to the case, here the European Convention on
Human Rights.' 0 7 Because the ECHR had to decide if the English courts
had violated the Convention, the Court also looked at the various UK

LOt! 9 (Christian Poncelet & Centre d'Etudes eds., 2004). This astonishing fact opens the door to
exploring the cause of the widespread erroneous perception, and whether it stems from a reaction
against the European legal directive, and more particularly from anxiety over the penetration of the
EU's alien approach into the national legal order perceived to be vulnerable to silent, creeping
systemic change that bypasses democratic channels of approval and adoption.
105. See GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 45; Mattei & Di Robilant, supra note 84, at
863.
106. For other illustrations of this phenomenon at work in the ECJ, see Koopmans, supra note
27. For the view that because the ECJ and the ECHR write long, explanatory decisions, they have
adopted the English style, and renounced the French style of reasoning, see Sophie Gjidara, La
motivation des d&isions dejustice: impiratifs aniciens et exigences nouvelles, PETITES AFFICHES,
May 26, 2004, at 3, 20.
107. These textual references are interspersed throughout the decision. See Pretty v. United
Kingdom, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 184.
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court opinions in Pretty that had preceded the applicant's
appeal to the
08
ECHR, as well as at the ECHR's own past decisions.1
With respect to a number of cases it cited and discussed, the ECHR
extracted a factually decontextualized, abstract, normative rule only.10 9
This reasoning exemplifies the civilian conception of case law, and is
compatible with a civilian reconceptualization of stare decisis as a
doctrine which may operate as an application of prior court decisions,
recognized as sources of law, even to future dissimilar case situations." 0
In addition to applying abstract principles from past cases, however, the
ECHR also reproduced long quotes from the House of Lords, and
thereby automatically engaged vicariously or metatextually in the
inductive, analogical reasoning process of the common law courts that
had adjudicated the case domestically."'
The ECHR then also proceeded to reason analogically on its own,
however, focusing on the Rodriguez case. 12 In discussing Rodriguez, the
ECHR engaged in reasoning antithetical to the civil law system rooted in
the text of the enacted law deemed to govern the case at bar, because the
court that had decided Rodriguez had not been interpreting the European
Convention on Human Rights, the text the ECHR was applying in
Pretty. Rodriguez had been decided under the Canadian Charter." 3 The
ECHR explicitly signaled this, thus indicating its own departure into the
waters of common law reasoning by factual analogy. It explained its
view that Rodriguez was relevant to Pretty in the most quintessential of
common law terms: because
Rodriguez "concerned a not dissimilar
'
situation to the present." 14
The ECHR upheld the UK's refusal to apply to assisted suicide a
domestic UK statute that had legalized suicide itself."5 The ECHR
found that the UK's refusal to immunize the applicant's husband from
future prosecution should he assist her in committing suicide did not
constitute a violation of such fundamental European Convention

108. See id. For a sweeping characterization of its own case law, see id.
at 188.
109. See, e.g., id.
at 190.
110. See supra notes 35-42, and accompanying text. The ECHR's other civilian aspects
included an evaluation of claims in terms of proportionality, and underscoring the need to interpret
all convention articles at issue in a mutually harmonious manner, evaluating if the challenged state
acts were out of proportion to legitimate state goal(s).
Ill. See Pretty, 2002-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. at 163.
112. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] S.C.R. 519; see Pretty, 2002-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
195.
113. SeeRodriguez, [1993] S.C.R.at 532.
114. Pretty, 2002-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 195.
115. Id.at 201.
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principles as the right to life; 116 the right to be free from inhumane or
degrading treatment;' 1 7 the right to self-determination;" 8 the right to
freedom of belief;" 9 and the right of the disabled to be free from
discriminatory treatment. 20 The ECHR emphasized that sanctity of life
and the respect for human dignity are foundational principles of the
Convention,' 2' upholding the UK position that "the sanctity of life
entails its inviolability by an outsider."' 122 The applicant's husband could
be deemed such an outsider.
The impact of the ECHR's convergent, bi-methodological Pretty
decision was not the end of the story, however. The final step always is
local, where European law is brought into its concrete applications. Most
lawyers in the EU have domestic practices, and read European court
decisions to the extent that they affect national law in general, and their
own practice of law in particular. They follow European law by reading
the regular, national law publications they are used to reading to keep
abreast of national court decisions. Since EU membership, these
publications now also include renditions and analyses of European law,
including ECHR and ECJ decisions. 123 The French case law publication
from which many in the French legal community received notice of the
case is La Semaine juridique.124 The purported reporting and
presentation of the ECHR Pretty decision in that publication
considerably distorted it due to (1) the highly excerpted format in which
the ECHR decision was reproduced; and (2) the thick filter of
interpretation that characterized the French legal commentary.
The French write-up was an entirely civil law analysis. The first
aspect of the European legal dis-integration, or retreat into the national,
was the French publication's translation of the ECHR decision in so
abridged a form as to be of a length typical for a French national court
decision. The ECHR decision of over forty pages was abridged into
116. Id.at 185-87.
117. Id. at 189-92.
118. Id. at 193-97.
119. Id. at 198-99.
120. Id. at 200-01.
121. Id. at 194-95.
122. Id.at 167 (quoting Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789, 831 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.)).
123. European court decisions also are summarized and commented on in special books
devoted to the case law of the European courts, but that reproduce only summaries of the courts'
decisions, along with the author's explanatory and evaluative commentary. The publications present
an interpretation of the decision, sometimes quite critical, and profoundly entrenched in national
legal ways of analyzing.
124. See Girault, supra note 24.
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fewer than four pages. 25 Because European court decisions are many
times longer than typical French court decisions, they are reproduced in
French publications of court decisions only in excerpted form. By
contrast, the typically far shorter decisions of French court generally are
reproduced in toto. Thus, the shortening of the European court decision
was the first step in the rendering familiar of European law to the French
legal community.
The choice of which ECHR passages to excerpt and which to elide
was the second national, civilian filter applied to Pretty. The abridged
version of the ECHR decision deleted virtually all of the common law
aspects of the original decision. Where a French summary of the ECHR
decision referred to cases the ECHR had analyzed, it did so in terms of
factually decontextualized, normative rules, very much like the massime
of the Italian private law supreme court discussed above. 126 Thus, the
choice of which ECHR passages to reproduce and which to elide became
a civilian filter in the way it was applied to Pretty. Consequently, even
though the French publication of Pretty purported to be an abridged
French translation of the original ECHR text, the French publication
reads in a very different way, and, moreover, in the same way that
national French court decisions read.
As is the customary manner of presenting national court decisions
127
in civil law systems, the French scholar also gave her own critique.
This involved an independent analysis of the European Convention's
application to the legal theories and arguments. The critique seems to a
common law reader to be like a court analysis, as though the scholar
were now the court. 128 Moreover, since the scholarly critique follows the
summary of the ECHR's decision, by its very position it implicitly
suggests that it is the last word, of greater analytical authority than the
ECHR's analysis, as indeed it will be within the French legal system,
since the judges who apply the ECHR case to future French cases will
be
129
looking to the scholarly commentary as to how it should be applied.
125.
126.
127.
128.
Germany

See Pretty, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 157; see also Girault, supra note 24, at 676-79.
See supranotes 38-39 and accompanying text.
See Girault, supra note 24.
For the role of scholars in steering court decisions in civil law culture, principally
and France, and its roots in Roman law, see, for example, JOHN P. DAWSON, THE

ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968).

129. There are two widely publicized cases in France today, ongoing as of this writing, dealing
with this issue. It is my contention that the judges will understand the ECHR decision in Pretty from
the Semaine juridique. The cases relate to the assisted suicide of Vincent Humbert, a young man
who publicly appealed for the right to die after being paralyzed in a car accident. His case became
famous when he appealed to President Chirac, and the latter refused to agree. The young man wrote
a book which was published within days of his death. See VINCENT HUMBERT, "JE VOUS DEMANDE
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The French scholar approved the ECHR's ruling against the
applicant, but was severely critical of the Court for relying on prior
cases. Without a glimmer of recognition that anything "common law"
had occurred, the French scholar wrote: "It seems that it is a case
decision... rather than a well-thought-out analysis ["plus qu'une
analyse reflchie"] that persuaded the European judges," 130 as though
the two were of a mutually exclusive nature. Indeed, the French phrase
also might be translated as "rather than a considered analysis," because
the words connote that an analysis based on a prior case is not "thoughtout" or "considered" at all in any legally valid sense.
The French scholar also was scandalized by the ECHR's suggestion
that, although the UK was not obliged to give advance immunity from
prosecution to the applicant's spouse, it also would not be obliged to
prosecute him. 131 Indeed, the ECHR had said that the UK's denial of
immunity from prosecution should be upheld in part because
the UK had
1 32
made clear that it might choose not to prosecute Mr. Pretty.
The French commentator wrote of this: "Is the [European] Court
giving us to understand that failure to apply the law can be an

answer.

. .?,,133

This would be incompatible with the civilian concept of

the supremacy of the law-text, of the supremacy of legislature over the
courts, of, in short, the civilian court's most immutable and fundamental
duty as being to apply laws that others have enacted. Indeed, the French
tradition was that the courts
were obliged to apply the law "even if one
' 34
can not discern its reason."'

LE DROIT DE MOURIR" (2003). His mother said she had helped him die, and was charged with
murder. See Marie Humbert, "Jene regrette rien," PARIS MATCH, Dec. 18-24, 2003, at 67. Within
days of the mother's announcement, however, his physician revealed that the mother's dosage of

poison had not been lethal, because Vincent had grown resistant to drugs, and that he, the physician,
had administered an additional dosage that was the lethal one. The physician has been charged with
premeditated murder. See FREDERIC CHAUSSOY, JE NE SUIS PAS UN ASSASSIN (2004). The case
provoked enormous outcry throughout France, with Vincent Humbert's book climbing the best-

seller list. In April 2005, France's parliament passed a new law, commonly referred to as the
"Humbert law," which relaxes standards for end-of-life-decisions, but does not legalize assisted
suicide. Law No. 2005-370 of Apr. 12, 2005, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Fran(aise [JO.]
[Official Gazette of France] Apr. 23, 2005, p. 7089.
130. Girault, supra note 24, at 681.

131.

Id.at 682.

132. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 197.
133. Girault, supra note 24, at 682 (emphasis added) ("La Cour veut-elle alors signifier que la
non-applicationde la loi
peut 9tre une riponse ...?").
134. Alain Pariente, Le refus de soins: reflexions sur un droit en construction, 5-2003 REVUE
DU DROIT PUBLIC 1419, 1435 (citing Conclusions sur I'arr&Mdrilhou, du 4 mai 1861, in 2 SIREY

493 (1862)).
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The French scholar pursued as follows: "We prefer to believe that
this [apparent ECHR approval of failing to apply the law] is not the
case"' 135 and that such unacceptable reasoning on the part of the ECHR
"would be beyond the thinking of the European judges."' 136 The French
author made clear that, if there should be any leeway by courts, it is not
37
to fail to prosecute, but that they need not actually punish anyone.
This quintessentially civilian perspective was reflected in the comments
of a physician at Paris' Cochin hospital on euthanasia: "Justice must
adjudicate cases like that of Dr. Chaussoy [who admitted to
administering the lethal dose to tetraplegic Vincent Humbert 138] with
clemency, by imposing a punishment
[only] of principle, but he must be
' 139
tried. The law is 'all or nothing."
Antoine Garapon, for many years a judge in France, has
commented that, in civilian legal culture, the "very objective of
law.. . lies in its symbolic expression rather than its application in
reality. This is why the distortion, in France, between the rigidity of law
and the versatility of its practice is confusing [to the common law
world]. 'A stiff rule, a soft practice,' said the great Tocqueville.... ,,40
This widespread civilian outlook can be seen in Germany as well.
In 2004, more than fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin wall, former
East German guards were convicted for the deaths of people trying to
flee west before reunification: "[but t]he men won't be punished, the
judge said."' 4' The civilian requirement that courts apply all enacted law
in what, to a common law eye, seems to be in name rather than in deed,
also can be seen in the German Federal Constitutional Court analysis of
a proposed statute to de-penalize, but not de-criminalize certain

135. Girault, supra note 24, at 682.
136. Id. ("pareilleconclusion dipassant . . . lapense desjuges europ~ens").
137. See Albert Maron et al., Droit penal etprocedurepnale,JCP 2005 1-161 31-35, at 1503.
(noting that French judges determine punishment). Cf LON L. FULLER, LAW IN QUEST FOR ITSELF

33-41 (photo. reprint 1978) (1940) (noting that all societies have laws on the books that are not
applied, and concluding that legal positivism is intellectually bankrupt).
138.
139.

See CHAUSSOY, supra note 129.
For Claire Chartier's interview with Dr. Debr6, see '7l nefaut pas ldgifirer," L'ExPRESS

(Fr.), Jan. 15, 2004, at 28. Dr. Debrd has joined the ranks of those who have written a book on the
subject. See BERNARD DEBRIS, NOUS T'AVONS TANT AtMt: L'EUTHANASIE, L'IMPOSSIBLE LOI
(2004).
140.

Antoine Garapon, French Legal Culture and the Shock of 'Globalization', 4 SOC. &

LEGAL STUD. 493, 500 (1995). This position was reflected by the H6pital Cochin doctor reacting to
the arrest of Vincent Humbert's attending physician. See HUMBERT, supra note 129.
141.

Former Guards Convicted Fifteen Years After Wall Fell, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 2004, at

8A (emphasis added).
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abortions.1 42 Similarly, in Italy, even the conscious decision to adopt a
common law adversarial model to replace Italian criminal procedure
stopped short of changing
the civilian obligation to prosecute all
143
violations of the law.

In the French rendition of Pretty, also typically civilian was the
scholar's sense of interpretive freedom in her own role. In describing the
144
applicant's argument as asking the court to "forgo applying the law"
and to "'authorize the future commission of [a] crime,' ' 145 the scholar
did not pause to consider how contrary to the applicant's own account of
her claim such a description might be.
In civil law states, the national law's coherence comes from a
complex fabric in which the scholar's voice is an important contributing
factor.146 Here, in a process reminiscent of regression to the mean, the
scholar re-assimilated the binding case into a civilian mode of reasoning
that rendered it familiar as a "case" to the French legal reader. In so
doing, the ECHR decision was transformed into a civilian court decision.
Further, the very existence of the civilian tradition of scholarcommentators to present, explain and critique court decisions plays a
crucial role in the meaning of court decisions in civilian states.1 47 Even if
La Semaine juridique had presented an exact word for word translation
of the entire ECHR decision, a decision that was highly detailed and
self-explanatory, a French lawyer with a domestic law practice would
not expect to understand Pretty directly from a court's writing. The
national lawyer focuses foremost on the scholarly critiques which follow

142.

See

Bundesverfassungsgericht

[BverfG]

[Federal

Constitutional

Court]

1975,

39

Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 (F.R.G.). Another scholar expressed
contemporary civilian judicial methodology as the "interpret[ation of] standards in light of their
goals and underlying principles and [the] restrict[ion] or expan[sion of] the scope of a particular
provision accordingly, when [the judges are] faced with a tension between the literal meaning of the
statute and those goals and principles." Victor Ferreres Comella, The European Model of
ConstitutionalReview of Legislation: Toward Decentralization?, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 461, 473
(2004).
143. See Ennio Amodio, The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained. Reforming Criminal
Procedurein Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 492 (2004).
144. Girault, supra note 24, at 679. ("elle demanda au Director of Public Prosecution...de
renoncer. . . 6faire application de la lo').
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 80-84 (2d ed. 1985).

147. An analogous point for common law is that much can be explained about English law by
its antecedents in the civil jury trial, despite its having renounced juries in non-criminal cases. As
John Dawson put it, "certain habits of the mind persist." John P. Dawson, The General Clauses,
Viewed From a Distance, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 441,454 (1977).
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the texts of court decisions, because civil law scholars play a
determinative role in both formulating and forming the meaning of court
decisions, and in transforming them into points of departure to be
followed by future courts, or into discredited approaches for future
courts to avoid. 148
The origins of the exalted role of scholars in France lie in part in the
cryptic style of the traditional French court decision, such that the text of
a court decision was not comprehensible without explanatory and
evaluative commentary. Under the influence of commissions that have
urged more transparent and explanatory writing by courts, some courts
in France have departed significantly in substance, if not in style, from
the traditional one-sentence decisions that could not be deciphered
without scholarly guidance. 149 For a lawyer to make use of such a
decision without taking into account the scholarly commentary written
about it, however, can be analogized to the common law peril of citing a
case without shepardizing it.' 50 Civil law national lawyers are not free to
interpret a court decision on their own because the judiciary itself
continues to rely on scholarly interpretation. This means that predicting
the outcome of a future case requires knowledge of the scholarly views
that the judges will be consulting.
The analogy to shepardizing is of limited accuracy, in the sense that
shepardizing serves to alert a United States common law lawyer to
subsequent court action that may have effected a change in the meaning
of an earlier court opinion, whether of reversal, modification,
explanation or the like through a later court's interpretation of the prior
case. In civilian systems, the initial meaning and import of a decision is
influenced by the input of the non-judicial commentator. In other words,
for the civilian lawyer,
a court decision has insufficient meaning on its
5
own at any point.

1

Finally, in France, the primacy of the scholarly commentator's
interpretations of court decisions is reflected by the respective physical
presentations of the texts the courts write and the texts the scholars
write. The Semainejuridique publication of the abridged ECHR French
translation of Pretty is in uninvitingly tiny print, with narrowly spaced
148.

See e.g., DAWSON, supra note 128 (discussing the various aspects of civilian legal

culture).
149.

See Lyndel V. Prott, A Change of Style in French Appellate Judgments, 7 ETUDES DE

LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE 51, 58-66 (1978).
150. For an illustration of this situation, see, for example, Vivian Grosswald Curran,
Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity: The French Example, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 677, 696

n.78 (2003).
151. See id.
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lines. 152 In contrast, the scholar's commentary that follows the case is in
much larger type, with more generous spacing between lines.153 The
effect is to suggest implicitly that the court decision is difficult to read,
and even that the reader may proceed directly to the scholarly write-up
that summarizes and analyzes it.
Pretty's journey thus demonstrates that EU legal convergence in
supranational institutions does not necessarily mean legal convergence
with the member states' national legal cultures. Failures of cross-cultural
legal understanding result from an absence of comparative analysis to
elucidate the legal norms underlying the relevant differing legal
mentalities that, in turn, give shape and meaning to legal concepts.

VI.

PAST AND PRESENT

In addition to having a trajectory suited to clarifying some of the
challenges to integrating law among different legal communities, on a
substantive level, the Pretty case elucidates another hidden mechanism
of law. The case involves the peculiar relation of present to past in the
establishment, evolution and transformation of legal significance.
Europe's past was a crucial but unspoken subtext of the European
court decision in Pretty because of the issue of assisted suicide. Perhaps
for no part of the post-war European order was the reaction against the
Nazi genocide more of a formative influence than for the European
Convention on Human Rights.1 54 And perhaps no issue so much as
euthanasia, including assisted suicide, is burdened today by associations
with the Hitler past that disturb and sometimes distort European and
indeed all western law, as courts struggle with the unexpected and the
misunderstood.

152. Girault, supra note 24, at 676-79.
153. Seeid. at 679-82.
154. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 44
(2004) ("Human rights emerged from the Holocaust"); Jonathan L. Black-Branch, Observing and
Enforcing Human Rights Under the Council of Europe: The Creation of a Permanent Court of
Human Rights, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L. L. 1, 2 (1996). But see Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 230 (2000)
(describing the foregoing as the "ideational" as opposed to the "realist" explanation of the ECHR's
origins, and offering an intermediate third explanation, namely: that the ECHR and other
international human rights institutions emerged from the effort of leaders of the renewed post-war
democracies of Germany, Italy and France, to ensure the future of democracy in their fragile states
through otherwise counter-intuitive agreements to abdicate national sovereignty in favor of binding
human rights commitments, commitments seen as desirable not so much for their own ethical value,
as for their perceived power to prevent future subversions of the newly installed democratic systems
in the countries that had fallen to fascism).

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:93

Hitler explicitly hierarchized life's value among differently ranked
groups, advocating and for a time practicing euthanasia against certain
groups, even within the German population categorized as Aryan,
55
principally those considered to be physically or mentally defective.
The Third Reich proclaimed that "[i]t is the supreme duty of a national
state to grant life... only to the healthy and hereditarily sound and
racially pure.
,,156 The lesson post-war western Europe determined to
take from the Hitler years was that henceforth all human life would be
considered equally worthy, and that all human life would be considered
sacred.157 This principle
was foundational to the European Convention
58
on Human Rights. 1
The ECHR is obliged under the European Convention of Human
Rights to uphold life as the most fundamental value and cornerstone of
the Convention.159 Legal claims that state-sanctioned prolongations of
life against the will of the living are themselves a violation of the right to
life take on an increasingly persuasive resonance, however, in our era of
previously unimaginable medical technology, with new realities
perturbing the meaning and definition of life. 60
The relevant legal language of the Convention has not changed, and
sanctity of life therefore continues to be evoked as the mandated
standard of law for all signatory states to the Convention.16 As modem
medicine shifted the medical definition of life, the law shifted its own
understanding of life in concert with evolving medical standards,
however. 162 The sanctity of life, the apparently clearest and least
disputable of legal foundations, is being perturbed as changes in life's
definitions challenge a law that was meant to be foundational, beyond
challenge, and forever valid, but that increasingly appears antiquated. In
particular, euthanasia and assisted suicide cases have involved patients
defined as being alive by medical definitions, but with so few physical

155. See ROBERT PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE: MEDICINE UNDER THE NAzIS 185-94 (1988);
RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 561 (1961); JAMES M. GLASS, "LIFE
UNWORTHY OF LIFE": RACIAL PHOBIA AND MASS MURDER IN HITLER'S GERMANY 61-62 (1997).
156. See the introductory quote to the book "LIFE UNWORTHY OF LIFE", supra note 155
(quoting Dr. Arthur Guest, Director of Public Health, Ministry of the Interior in the Third Reich,

1935).
157. See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note 154, at 44.
158.

See European Convention, supra note 19.

159. See id.
at art. 2.
160.

See PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL

ETHICS 20-22 (1994).
161.

See Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 164-67.

162. See SINGER, supra note 160, at 27-28.
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functions as to lend credibility to those who plead to end it. 163 A closer
look at the ECHR decision reveals that the Court has been swayed by
societal transformations, and that it no longer applies a sanctity of life
standard in anything but name. 164 In so doing, the ECHR is not initiating,
but rather,
joining the major judicial trend throughout the western
16
world. 5
In proclaiming sanctity of life in Pretty, the ECHR and the French
scholar both cite to the UK Bland case in a decontextualized way,
quoting the House of Lords' statement in Bland that it was applying
sanctity of life as the legal standard.166 In that case, however, the UK
courts had upheld the right of doctors to decide on behalf of a patient in
a persistent vegetative state that it would be in the patient's best interests
for his feeding tube to be removed because "[t]he consciousness which
is the essential feature of individual personality has departed for ever"
while his brain continued to function, such that "there [was] every
likelihood that he [would] maintain his present state of existence for
many years to come."' 167 The patient himself was not able to make any
judgment or express any opinion.168 The doctor's measures were
categorized as legally analogous to withholding medical treatment, but
what was being withheld was nourishment, not medicine, and the
withholding had as its purpose the death of the patient.' 69 In legitimating
the doctors' actions, the House of Lords insisted, contrary to evidence,
that it still was adhering to a sanctity of life standard, 70 and it is for that
abstractly stated, decontextualized dictum that the ECHR and the French
commentator cite Bland, in true civilian style, with no reference to the
facts of the actual case. 17 On the contrary, however, the Bland decision

163. See id at 132-58 (providing examples of cases where arguments in favor of actively
ending patients' lives via euthanasia and assisted suicide were persuasive).
164. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text. Peter Singer has shown this shift
throughout the western world. See SINGER, supra note 160, at 132-58.
165. See SINGER, supra note 160, at 20-37.
166. Pretty, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 163; Girault, supra note 24, at 680.
167. Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789, 856 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.).
168. See id.at 860 (Lord Goff of Chieveley).
169. See id. at 867-68, 870 (categorizing the Bland case in the above-described manner as a
result of what Lord Goff called a correct formulation of the question). Lord Goff responds to his
"formulation of the question" by stating that "[tihere is overwhelming evidence that, in the medical
profession, artificial feeding is regarded as a form of medical treatment." Id. at 868, 870; see also
SINGER, supra note 160, at 65-68 (categorizing nourishment as medical treatment is the leap from
sanctity of life to quality of life in applicable legal standard).
170. See Bland, [1993] A.C. at 863-64, 899; SINGER, supra note 160, at 66-67.
171. See Pretty, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 167; Girault, supra note 24, at 680.
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marked, as Peter Singer has shown, the end of sanctity of life as the7 2legal
standard courts apply, and a transition to a quality of life standard.1
Under the immutable term "sanctity of life," a sea change in the
meaning of the law occurred silently. The decision to withhold
nourishment from Bland was justified as being in the best interests of the
patient who otherwise would continue to live in a medical sense, but
whose best interests the court agreed would not be served by such a
life.173 The evaluation of whether Bland's life was worth continuing thus
was the true criterion applied.
This is a legal standard of quality of life. 174 To put it another way,
to the extent that the judicial inquiry into whether physical life is of a
quality to justify its continuation now has become essential to
understanding and applying the legal standard of sanctity of life, then
sanctity of life has become coterminous with a life of quality. The legal
term, "sanctity of life" consequently no longer signifies that all physical
life is to be deemed sacred, since, on the contrary, it may be deemed to
be of too poor a quality to require preservation.
In Pretty, the ECHR had faced a dual problem: on the one hand, it
struggled with the age-old difficulty for courts that are governed by
textual language no longer appropriate to recent societal developments;
on the other hand, the peculiar need to cling to the sanctity of life
standard because of the historical associations that had inspired it. The
specter of Nazi Europe's rejection of human life as sacred,' 75 and
biblical teachings' contrasting insistence on it, 176 are shared by all the

172.
173.
174.
175.

Bland, [1993] A.C. 789; SINGER, supra note 160, at 57-80.
See Bland, [1993] A.C. at 868, 877.
This is one of the central points of SINGER, supra note 160, at 65-68.
See IGNATIEFF, supra note 154, at 44. When Peter Singer has lectured on the right to die,

he has been received with particular animosity by German audiences, where it was explained to him
that he was unable to identify sufficiently with German society's need to sanctify life as part of

Germany's commitment to avoiding anything tainted by Hitler's disregard for the right to life. See
Daniel Mendelsohn, The Fate of a Humanist, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2003, at 51 (reviewing
SINGER, supra note 160). Ironically, Singer is the grandson of a collaborator of Sigmund Freud,
David Oppenheim, who was deported to the Nazi concentration camp, Theresienstadt, because he
was Jewish, and died there. Singer wrote a stirring book about the life and times of Oppenheim. See
PETER SINGER, PUSHING TIME AWAY: MY GRANDFATHER AND THE TRAGEDY OF JEWISH VIENNA

(2003).
176. See, e.g., Genesis 1:27 (humans are created in God's image); Ren6 Cassin, From the Ten
Commandments to the Rights of Man, htp://www.udhr.org/history/tencomms.htm (last visited Mar.

21, 2005) (arguing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights derives from Judeo-Christian
tradition despite determination of its drafters not to draw inspiration from religion). Accord PHILIP
S. JOHNSON, WICCANS AND CHRISTIANS: SOME MUTUAL CHALLENGES 7, available at
http://www.jesus.com.au/html/page/human rights/. The European Convention on Human Rights
took direct and open inspiration from the Universal Declaration. See European Convention, supra
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European member states and were the common heritage of the
Convention drafters. The ECHR's resolution of the dilemma was to
allow the language of the law to disguise its meaning. As Paul de Man
put it, "[i]t is the distinctive privilege of language to be able to hide
history of law is of ample
meaning behind a misleading sign."' 177 The
78
judicial use of this attribute of language. 1
Pretty suggests the need to engage in an open comparative analysis
between present and past, with increased attention to historical
antecedents. The struggle to understand the present is the search for
which comparisons are the most valid and accurate. To what is the claim
of a right to die most analogous? Should it be analogized to or
differentiated from Hitler's theory of the life of the ill as defective and
valueless? Should it be analogized to or differentiated from the right of
the individual to be independent to choose, to be autonomous, and to be
free of state interference in individual life and death decisions? Should it
be analogized to biblical teachings of life as sacred even though "life"
was itself a different concept in biblical times and long afterwards, until
the advent of modem medicine? It is far from clear if the ECHR judges
understood the ways in which the past may have influenced their
decision-making.
Pretty suggests that one price of insufficient examination of the past
in Europe has been the formation in law of unreflective associations with
the past, which in turn have created an orthodoxy in judicial
interpretation that is ill-equipped to adjudicate pressing issues of our
time.
The look backwards unfortunately has become increasingly
unpopular in Europe, as though the EU's raison d'Otre of avoiding the
evils of the past is ensured of success, as though a new, permanent
triumph of civilization in Europe were among its acquis
communautaires,179 rendering the backward glance not just tedious but
also superfluous. As a line from a French poem ("[r]ien n'est jamais
note 19, at pmbl. ("Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948 .... ").
177. PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY
CRITICISM 11 (2d ed. 1983).
178. PIERRE BOURDIEU, CE QUE PARLER VEUT DIRE 21 (1982) ("Legal discourse is a language
of creation that gives existence to that which it articulates."); see also EDWARD LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949) (discussing law and language); Balkin, supra note 6.
179. See, e.g., Jiirgen Habermas, On the Public Use of History, in JORGEN HABERMAS, THE
POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 29 (Max Pensky trans. & ed., 2001)
(describing mounting resentment against the "look back"). For an explanation of acquis

communautaire, see Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The ConstitutionalImpact of the
Accession ofAustria, Finlandand Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1092, 1140-57 (1995).
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acquis 6 l'homme"' 80 ) implies, in life and history, nothing acquired can
be deemed to have been acquired definitively, and the past forever needs
to be revisited for its instructive potential. A better understanding of the
past in its historical context would improve the judiciary's acuity in
establishing more valid analogies and distinctions with historical
models, better enabling it to reconcile current needs and issues with law,
without betraying foundational values. 181
Not only did both the ECHR and the French scholar cite Bland for
the principle of sanctity of life, but the French commentator also
concluded that the applicant had to lose her claim because to validate it
would be to cause the ill to lack human dignity. 82 The scholar wrote that
the ECHR's decision had done no less than restore human dignity to the
dying and agonizing.' 83 The problems in the logic of this reasoning may
seem apparent, but they are particularly striking when contrasted with a
point to opposite effect that Bruno Bettelheim made in an essay on
Helen Keller and Anne Frank.184 He had been explaining his
observations on the disintegration of the personality during his own
imprisonment in a concentration camp, where, already a trained
psychologist, he had concluded that human life does not always retain
anything resembling the core of human identity, as most people conceive
of their identifying attributes. 85 His second point was that the belief that
physical life always permits one's essential personality to remain intact
is a widespread and tenaciously held illusion.' 86 He explained the wild
180. LOuis
ARAGON,
IL
N'Y
A
PAS
D'AMOUR
HEUREUX,
available at
http://www.feelingsurfer.net/garp/poesie/aragon.amour.html.
181. For an excellent account of the failure of historical jurisprudence to take root in England,
see Neil Duxbury, English JurisprudenceBetween Austin and Hart, 91 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2005).
On Germany, see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW:
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY (2001).
182. Girault, supra note 24, at 682.
183. Id.
184. I read this essay during the 1970s, but have been unable to locate it. I cite hereinafter to
several other publications in which Bettelheim made similar or supporting points. Confirmation
from Bettelheim himself that he wrote the essay may be found in BRUNO BETrELHEIM, FREUD'S
VIENNA AND OTHER ESSAYS 256 (Alfred A. Knopf 1990) (1956): "Some time ago I questioned in
print why there is such vast admiration for the Diary ofAnne Frank." With respect to Helen Keller,
Bettelheim wrote that "[t]he world raved about Helen because she permitted us the illusion that one
can have a complete, happy life although one is blind and deaf." Id. at 163.
185. On the human personality's capacity for total disintegration while the person remains
biologically alive, see BRUNO BETTELHEIM, SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 9-11, 13, 106-10,
113-14 (Alfred A. Knopf 1979) (1952).
186. Bruno Bettelheim, The Ignored Lesson ofAnne Frank, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 1960, at 45
("To have to accept that one's personality might be changed against one's will is the greatest threat
to one's self-respect .... The universal success of The Diary ofAnne Frank suggests how much the
tendency to deny the reality of the camps is still with us."). Bettelheim analyzed Helen Keller's life
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popularity of Helen Keller and Anne Frank as their enabling this
illusion, and then proceeded to debunk it through a detailed analysis of
the despair Helen Keller revealed in some of her writing, including
private letters; and the dehumanizing end of Anne Frank's life, not
contained in the diary that had closed before she was deported to a
concentration camp.
Bettelheim's argument, put into the language of an assisted suicide
case like Diane Pretty's, was that biological life can be utterly without
quality of life, such that to uphold life as sacred under a "sanctity of life"
standard need not be to uphold quality of life. If Bettelheim was right,
the European Convention's dual principles of sanctity of life and quality
of life may be pitted against each other irreconcilably. 187 The ECHR was
more nuanced on this issue than the French scholarly commentator. The
ECHR acknowledged a tension between quality and sanctity of life,188
whereas the French commentator saw no justification in the Convention
sanctity through calls for
for the modem trend to challenge life's
89
suicide.
assisted
and
euthanasia
legalized
Had the ECHR examined more extensively and actively the
historical antecedents of the Convention, including the Nazi past, its
transition to a quality of life legal standard might have been made more
openly, and debated with greater acuity, with more profit for the future.
A comparative engagement with the past might enable the ECHR to
chart a path to a better understanding of how courts today can respond to
the needs of rapidly changing societies, without betraying the values that
legal texts can convey only imperfectly through language.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Facts and fictions in our internationalizing world are hard to
perceive and to assess because we evaluate what we are seeing by means
of the only frames of reference we can have, those formed by and for
past events, and they impede our ability to detect the new, limiting and

in a similar manner, analyzing a letter she wrote in rejection of a marriage proposal that revealed
despair, in contradiction to the portrayal of herself she presented to the public. He analogized the
two women as enabling the public to deny truths about dehumanized lives that were too terrible for
most people to accept. A recent essay about the life of Helen Keller does not make Bettelheim's
precise point, but suggests the extent to which Keller constructed her personality through a web of
language. See Roger Shattuck, A World of Words, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 26, 2004, at 21.
187. On the ECHR's problems in hierarchizing various rights, see Gerald L. Neuman, Talking
to Ourselves, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 139, 141-42 (2005).
188. See Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 163.
189. Girault, supranote 24, at 682.
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defining our "horizon of interpretation."' 90 The "trace" '1 9' of the old is
essential to allowing us to configure
the new, such that the absolutely
92
new is "absolutely incognizable."'
When we try to discern the ever-changing and superimposed legal
worlds today, we are like adults who scrutinize a newborn. The infant
has physical, mental and emotional features, but, although some
individualizing characteristics are observable, they are vague and
unformed when compared to the precise contours they will acquire with
time. Much later, looking back, we may see or think we see how the
features of the present were prefigured in the first stages of life, but only
retrospectively can we make the connections that would have enabled us
to understand them earlier. Moreover, even retrospective perception will
not make clear how much of what developed might have taken a
different shape, how much was due to inalterable constitutive
ingredients, such as our genetic code, and how much to the particulars of
life, to causalities that were steered by contingent events and by their
contingent confluences, those infinities of variables that make history's
progression seem linked to chaos rather than to plan.
In the present time of particular flux, decision-makers are making
readjustments that will have great impact on the future. In Europe, the
stakes for the future manifestly relating to legal integration include
(1) the extent to which law should be made uniform, which in turn raises
issues of whether legal uniformity can be legitimate; (2) whether legal
integration can be meaningful, or if, rather, it is conceptually incoherent;
and (3) whether adopting a European civil code would signal an
undesirable and illegitimate shift in direction away from national legal
autonomy, or if it would be reasonable, worthy and necessary. On the
world stage, similar issues arise as to whether the tide of
transgovernmentalism should be welcomed or stemmed and whether the
dizzying array of legal standards, texts and claims emerging in ever new
configurations require concerted world action.
Understanding Europe's law is a vital task today, as it may provide
the best model for understanding the elusive nature of mixtures of the
non-national and the national throughout the world. An essential part of
understanding the present also lies in understanding and examining the

190. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 333, 397 (Sheed and Ward Ltd.
trans., 1975).
191. See THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 24,30 (Nathan Houser
& Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) [hereinafter PEIRCE]; 3 PAUL RIC(EUR, TEMPS ET RtCIT177-83

(1985).
192.

PEIRCE, supra note 191, at 30.
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one's own time
past. 193 To ignore the past is to preclude understanding
94
it.'
betray
to
also
suggested,
been
has
it
and,
It has been suggested that structuralattributes of the modem nation
state which developed since the French Revolution had much to do with
the cataclysm of Hitlerism and the Nazi genocide in Europe, and that
genocide should be considered a predictable outcome of all modem
nation states because of that inner, entrenched structural logic which
"loads the dice" in favor of massacres for reasons other than substantive
politics or ideology. 195 In a review of the history of law in Europe that
seemed nostalgic for a time he had not known himself, Rudolf
Schlesinger evoked the end of the jus commune as beginning with the
rise of national codifications.' 96 Although Schlesinger never said so
explicitly, he may have seen a direct, however inadvertent, link between
the rise of codification and the pernicious nationalism and persecution 1of
97
the "other" that he experienced in his own youth in Nazi Germany.
Schlesinger devoted many years to the pursuit of legal "common cores"
that might provide a unifying element for humanity through shared legal
values that he believed to reside beneath the surface of systemic and
national differences.' 98 National civil codes are envisaged, as we have
seen above, as coherent systems of thought and expressions of the entire
spirit of the nation's law. 199 Their ascendancy ended the need for judges
to seek counsel outside of their country, and indeed increasingly made
resort to foreign law of questionable legitimacy.

193. See supra notes 180-81 (comparing Habermas's account of mounting resentment against
the "look back").
194. "Indem wir die Geschichte ignorieren, verleumden wir gleichzeitig unsere Zeit." ("To the

extent we ignore history, we also betray our own time."). Nachrichtendienst fur Historiker,
http://www.nfhdata.de/premium/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 12, 2004). "Ohne Kenntnis unserer
Geschichte bleibt die Gegenwart unbegreifbar." ("Without knowledge of our history, the present
remains beyond our grasp."). Id. (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
195. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1989); see also HILBERG, supra
note 155 (suggesting a similar conclusion); ENZO TRAVERSO, THE ORIGINS OF NAZI VIOLENCE

(Janet Lloyd trans., 2003) (same).
196.

See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of ComparativeLaw, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.

477, 479 (1995). On the link between the national and the European civil codes, see Zimmermann,
The "Europeanization" of PrivateLaw, supra note 46, at 63-64, 65 n.8; (citing additional sources
UND
INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT
FRANZ
WIEACKER,
issue,
including
on
this
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG 79 (1974)); see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 181, at 2 (arguing that
national national codifications caused the loss of "fundamental intellectual unity" in European law).
197. For my reading of Schlesinger's view on this matter, see Curran, Shoulders of
Schlesinger,supra note 86.
198. Schlesinger, supra note 196.
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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Phenomena such as national codifications are precisely the sort of
inherently innocent structures that Zygmunt Bauman seeks to identify as
related, not culpably, but nevertheless causally, with modem massacres
to the extent that they relate to "technological-bureaucratic patterns of
action and the mentality they institutionalize, generate, sustain and
reproduce. ' 200 Christian Joerges, one of the few in Europe today who
insist on the look backwards as Europe engages in steering law toward
its future, has suggested disconcerting aspects of the EU as having
unexamined roots in Nazi legal conceptions developed by Carl
Schmitt.20 '
One may ask today what the best analogy would be to a European
civil code. It simply might transpose the problem Schlesinger signaled to
a wider geographical arena, such that the nationalization of law now
would be widened to a Europeanization of law, but with the potential for
planting new seeds of exclusion in the process, a structural spur to
creating a unitary self that rejects pluralism and a newly defined "other,"
adopting a new jus commune, but for Europe only, rather than for a
wider world.20 2
Bauman emphasizes the dangers of seemingly neutral structures
and the need to study where structures may lead as they channel the
substantive values a society institutionalizes.20 3 If he is right, then a
substantive emphasis on individual human rights and even the right to
life as cornerstones of the EU's value system and legal order, and as the
cornerstone of universally acknowledged legal rights in international
law, on their own would not represent a future safeguard for those

200.

BAUMAN, supra note 195, at 95.

201. See Christian Joerges, Europe a Grofiraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the
Integration Project, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE 167 (Christian Joerges & Navraj

Singh Galeigh eds., 2003). Another European who also insists on the value of the look backwards is
Reinhard Zimmermann. See Zimmermann, The "Europeanization"of PrivateLaw, supra note 46,

at 82-86 (stating that a preliminary to a successful European civil code is a thorough understanding
of the common bases of law in Europe, through the study of Roman law). Zimmermann also has
contributed greatly to the look backwards in numerous ways in his excellent book, JURISTS
UPROOTED, supra note 74. Bernd Ruthers and Michael Stolleis are yet others, whose many

contributions are of inestimable value in this regard.
202.

This is the issue increasingly referred to today as "Fortress Europe." This issue has been

raised in particular with respect to issues of citizenship and immigration. See, e.g., Sophie RobinOlivier, Citizens and Noncitizens in Europe: European Union Measures Against Terrorism After
September 11, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 197 (2005); Lydia Esteve Gonzilez & Richard Mac
Bride, Fortress Europe: Fear of Immigration? Present and Future of Immigration Law and Policy
in Spain, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 153 (2000); Michael Pugh, DrowningNot Waving: Boat
People and Humanitarianismat Sea, 17 J. REFUGEE STUDIES 50,54 (2004).
203. See BAUMAN, supra note 195.
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rights.2 °4 On the other hand, if the modem nation state's semiotic
"grammar" is an indispensable causal aspect of genocide, it may be that
Europe, through an imaginative and perceptive reconfiguration by means
of its non-national character, can develop structures to resist such an
inner logic of modernity that is embedded in the nation state model. If it
can do so, it may become a model on a larger, world scale.
The question is vast and intricate, and an unreflective rejection of
the nation state model also may prove disastrous. As Max Pensky sums
it up in his introduction to Habermas's The PostnationalConstellation,
"the nation-state is fading ...[b]ut ...there is no guarantee that [it] will

be replaced by anything better., 20 5 The non-national model may contain
the very attributes that were the most dangerous in the nation state
model. If the non-national proceeds blindly, it may exacerbate the worst
that we have known in the national, loading the dice to favor the
likelihood of human catastrophe even more than occurred within modem
nation states. For instance, as has been suggested by others, postnationhood could spell the end of the ground in which democracy can
most easily flourish and thereby increase the chances for autocratic,
undemocratic rule, fulfilling one of the pre-conditions for the destruction
of human rights.20 6
Ever-growing, albeit no longer national, bureaucracies may
facilitate, rather than hinder, the potential for ruthless impersonality that
the modem nation state was the first to hone, and that has been central in
perpetrating massacres.20 7 On the other hand, non-national bureaucratic
structures' coexistence with national counterparts may reduce this
danger.20 8 Objectives of cultural pluralism, dedicated to preserving the
national, may militate against harmony and coexistence, or, on the
204. See id.
Along these general lines, see also Koskenniemi, infra note 209.
205. HABERMAS, supra note 179, at xiii.
206. See NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE AND NATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 159-95 (1999). See also Eric Stein, InternationalIntegration and

Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 489-95 (2001) (stating that democracy
may be correlated inextricably with the nation-state, but also suggesting that this may be due to
current weakness of non-national institutions); accord Eric Stein, Democracy Beyond Nation State:
On World Trade Organization and European Union, 2 DEAN RUSK LECTURES: DEAN RUSK

CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERS 7, 10 (2003); cf George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:
Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 341 (1994)
(discussing how the subsidiarity principle may safeguard democracy in the EU by enhancing local
governance).
207. See BAUMAN, supra note 195 and accompanying text.
208. Bignami's analysis of the pressures on the EU Commission, leading to its growing
protection of individual rights, gives rise to hope that this may prove to be the case. See Francesca
Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests, 11 COLUM. J.

EUR. L. (forthcoming 2005).
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contrary, in the context of increased contact, may engender a beneficial
convergence based on mutual comprehension. Convergence, whether of
law or of other institutions formerly separated along national lines, may
be a disguise for dominance, or may be the product of a pluralistic blend
that reinforces mutuality of respect.20 9
Habermas's optimistic vision of a capacity to reformulate in
individuals loyalties from nations to non-national configurations, as in
earlier times loyalty to nation developed in modem states from smallerscale loyalties ("to village and clan" 210), even if accurate, cannot foretell
if such a transfer is desirable or if the loyalty in question, however
oriented, is problematic inherently and will remain unable to expurgate
the will to annihilate the "other" that in the past on occasion
accompanied loyalty to nation.
Habermas believes that in Europe the saving grace is an "otherness"
that derives from unshared national pasts, and that it will persist among
Europeans, such that developing loyalty to the European phenomenon
would mean precluding the will to annihilate the other: "Citizens who
share a common political life also are others to one another, and each is
entitled to remain an Other." 2 11 If it is successful, the EU may be able to
trace a path for itself and the rest of the world from the flawed and tragic
209. This tension was a main preoccupation in the writing of Isaiah Berlin. See, e.g., ISAIAH
BERLIN, THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT: THE 18TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS 11 (1984); ISAIAH
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); ISAIAH BERLIN, VICO AND HERDER: TWO STUDIES IN
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1976); CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS BY ISAIAH
BERLIN (Henry Hardy ed., 1978); ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY (Henry
Hardy ed., 1991); ISAIAH BERLIN, THE SENSE OF REALITY (Henry Hardy ed., 1996); ISAIAH

BERLIN, THE POWER OF IDEAS (Henry Hardy ed., 2000). For more recent discussions of similar
issues, see Martti Koskenniemi, InternationalLaw in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16

EUR. J. INT'L L. 113, 115 (2005) (noting in the tradition of Herder that "the universal has no voice,
no authentic representative of its own. It can only appear through something particular; only a
particular can make the universal known"); KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY

(2005) (discussing similar issues from the perspective of Mills, whom Berlin also discussed at
length in the sources cited above).
210. Jorgen Habermas, What is a People?: The Frankfurt "Germanists" Assembly" of 1846
and the Self-Understandingof the Humanities in the Vormgrz, in HABERMAS, supra note 179, at 1,
18 [hereinafter Habermas, What is a People?]. Cf Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of
Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 215 (2003) ("Communities may gradually emerge, but they often

require conscious construction.").
211.

Habermas, What is a People?, supra note 210, at 19. 1 think also of George Steiner's

comment, written some forty years ago, at a time when many of the dizzying changes in the EU and
the world that are the subject of this article would have been unforeseeable. Steiner's vision
characteristically is darker than Habermas's, but he formulated similar ideas about provisional
loyalties that society would have to help individuals develop in order overcome the national. He

concluded that "though the ideal of a non-national society seems mockingly remote, there is in the
last analysis no other alternative to self-destruction." GEORGE STEINER, LANGUAGE AND SILENCE:
ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND THE INHUMAN 153 (1967).
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modernity that spawned it into a socio-political phenomenon that can
better perpetuate substantive ideals of human rights and civilization.
Isaiah Berlin's analysis of the human-wide tendency to create
"others" casts some doubt on Habermas's optimism. The emotional
depth of the need to create identity by differentiation from the "other"
that Berlin describes does not contradict Habermas's view that
"collective identities are made, not found," 2 12 but it casts doubt on
whether any collective identity that falls short of the global, once made,
can avoid xenophobia.2 3 It also casts doubt on whether an identity that
claims global proportions can succeed in time in being anything more
than superficial, ever vulnerable to the deep tribal instincts that lead
people to crave identities that they forge in a mutually dependent
process
2 14
of choosing sameness with some, and difference from others.
We also must bear in mind that structures set in place today will
steer future developments less than the decision-makers expect and
hope, as well as differently and unpredictably. How much stability or
predictability institutions can ensure has been a matter of unresolved
debate for centuries. Montesquieu believed that the foundational
moments of institutions are primordial, because "[a]t the birth of
societies ... the rulers of Republics establish institutions and afterwards

the institutions mould the rulers. 215 A similar emphasis on the power of
institutions to preserve stability through time and current events infuses
the perspective of historical institutionalism, 2 16 yet history itself seems to
suggest a story of far more mutual interaction in the dynamic between
the ever-changing present and the ever-vulnerable institutions charged
with resisting flux. 2 17 The winds of the future are beyond prediction, but
212. Habermas, What is a People?,supra note 210, at 19.
213. For an analysis of global citizenship issues, see Massimo La Torre, Global Citizenship?
PoliticalRights Under Imperial Conditions, 18 RATIO JuRIS 236 (2005).

214. While I use Berlin to caution against Habermas's optimism, Berlin himself did not view
the twentieth century's tragic historical consequences of collective identity as the necessary
outcome. Rather, he analyzed the past also in terms of a better outcome that might have been
possible. See in particular his wistful analysis of Alexander Herzen and Russian populism as
evidence that collective identities and the progeny of Romanticism's ideals might have engendered
coexistence in mutual appreciation and respect, rather than ferocious hatred and exterminationist
persecution of the other. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 186-209, 210-37 (Henry
Hardy & Aileen Kelly eds., 1978); see also Isaiah Berlin, Montesquieu, in 41 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BRITISH ACADEMY 267 (1955) (discussing the possibility of mutual respect among societies with
differing values).
215. JEAN JACQUES RouSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 38 (G. D. H. Cole
trans., 1950) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE GREATNESS AND DECADENCE OF THE ROMANS (1734)).

216. See Bignami, supra note 208, and sources cited therein.
217. See ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1946). This has been a principal theme
of some of my past writing. See Curran, supra note 102; Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of
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the more penetratingly the past and the present are scrutinized for all that
"lurks unseen" within them, 218 the better decision-makers will be able to
decide where and how to try to preserve, and where and how to try to
transcend the national.
Historical and sociological research suggests that the most humane
of substantive legal foundations may be ineffectual unless endowed with
the necessary structural apparatus to bolster substantive ideals.21 9
Foundational times are periods of hope that institutional constructions
can guide those who will people them in the future. The dashing of many
eighteenth century values and hopes in the twentieth century may incline
one towards the less optimistic view that, whatever the foundational
moments and institutional protections may be, tribalism in human nature
will ensure repeated catastrophes of ever worse proportions as modem
technology better enables mass murder and subjugation.
While each new attempt to perpetuate a humane rule of law must
remain experimental until history provides some perspective on its
success, Europe today is an act of faith of our time that may have the
capacity to generate a new social era and a step forward in
civilization. 220 Alternatively, if the past and present are not examined
more searchingly, Europe may prove mired in structures whose novelty
is superficial, a language of a new vocabulary generated by unchanged
deeper structures of grammar and syntax. 22 1 The EU today is developing
strategies of national and non-national coexistence, with options
constrained principally only by the limits of imagination. The European
mosaic reflects presences of the past and harbingers of the future that
may facilitate consideration of similar issues on a larger scale, as law remembers.
Formalism: Indicationsfrom the FascistPeriod in Franceand Germany of JudicialMethodology's
Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101 (2001-2002).
218. The phrase is from KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE

LAW 45 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
219. See BAUMAN, supra note 195; Vivian Grosswald Curran, Racism's Past and Law's
Future, 28 VT. L. REV. 683 (2004).
220. There are many sources one might cite to convey concepts of civilization. I cite only one,
a beautiful work that ties together much that has to do with hopes, thoughts and realities in the
context of law. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001).

221. See Koskenniemi, International Law as Political Theology, supra note 12, at 492-93
("Europeans embrace the Kantian view that the international world will in due course organize itself
analogously to the domestic one .... "); see also Koskenniemi, supra note 209, at 120 (describing
the lawyer's task as being to connect the present "to what... happened previously, a case, a
precedent, tell it as part of a history. The point of the law [is] to detach the particular from its
particularity by linking it with narratives in which it received a generalizable meaning, and the
politician [can] see what to do with it.").

